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Kathy Wilkes Dr Honoris Causa of the University of Zagreb 2001
By Prof.Dr. Darko Zubrinic | Published  07/4/2012 | Bilingual , Croatian Heroes , Human Rights , People , In Memoriam , Education | Unrated
Kathy Wilkes at the University of Zagreb in 2001, part 1


Dr. Kathleen Vaughan Wilkes at the University of Zagreb in 2001


Some of the recipients of Doctorate Honoris Causa from the University of Zagreb: William J. Perry, Margaret Thatcher, Kathaleen Vaughan Willkes




On the left Professor Branko Jeren, Chancellor of the University of Zagreb


Dr. Kathleen Vuaghan Wilkes (1946-2003) with Professor Branko Jeren.
She is a honorary citzien of the City of Dubrovnik since 1993.
She died in Oxford, and according to her last wish, her ashes have been strewn over see in the City of Dubrovnik. Photo from 1999.

Diploma of Dr Honoris Causa title of the University of Zagreb, printed in Latin language.

 
Predavanje održano 22. svibnja 2001. u auli Sveučilišta u Zagrebu

Dr. Kathleen Vaughan Wilkes

Globalizacija i nacionalizam

Za početak prilično sumornog govora, zgodna misao Johanna Gottfrieda von Herdera iz 1971.:
"Kako je Priroda čudesno razdvojila nacije ne samo šumama i planinama, morima i pustinjama, rijekama i klimama, nego posebice i jezicima, sklonostima i osobinama samo da bi djelovanje podjarmljujućeg despotizma učinila što težim …"

Tijekom nekoliko posljednjih mjeseci vidjeli smo mnogo prosvjeda protiv "globalizacije". Došlo je do "Bitke u Seattleu", izgreda u Washingtonu, tučnjava u Pragu, a posljednjih dana svibnja i do demonstracija – nekih mirnih, nekih manje mirnih – u Berlinu, Sydneyju, Londonu i desecima drugih mjesta.

Nejasno je što su točno ti prosvjednici i demonstranti željeli postići. U Londonu je, primjerice, bilo anarhista koji su tražili sukob ili su željeli provaliti u banke i vladine zgrade i zauzeti ih (ili tek razbiti nekoliko izloga i nešto opljačkati); bilo je zabrinutih za planetarno onečišćenje i zakrčenost prometa; onih koji brinu zbog sve većeg jaza između bogatih i siromašnih zemalja te zbog načina na koji MMF/Svjetska banka postupa prema zemljama u razvoju; bilo je onih iz Udruženja za zaštitu interesa seljaka (Countryside Alliance) i onih koji žele zabraniti lov na lisice psima, ribarenje, lov divljači; bili su tamo i otpušteni radnici čeličana, druge je brinula korupcija ili nemoral u politici; bili su tu aktivisti za ljudska prava, pobornici mogućnosti legalnog prava na pobačaj i oni koji se tome protive; neki su bili gnjevni zbog testiranja novih lijekova na životinjama, drugi bijesni što su lijekovi za ublažavanje učinaka virusa HIV-a patentirani i preskupi da bi ih AIDS–om pogođene afričke zemlje mogle kupovati i propisivati oboljelima. (Sve to zbog nužnosti stvaranja profita multinacionalnih farmaceutskih kompanija.) Mnogi drugi smatrali su da su izostavljeni iz procesa odlučivanja u Britaniji ili da britansku nezavisnost, zapravo njezinu suverenost, nagriza utjecaj Europske unije.

Mnogi prosvjednici djelovali su nesigurni u ono što žele; jedan transparent je glasio: "Riješite se kapitalizma. Zamijenite ga nečim boljim." Možda je zajednička nit, tema na koju ćemo se vratiti, bio dojam prosvjednika da su tek figure u igri koju negdje drugdje vode neki neizabrani drugi i manipuliraju njima iza neprozirnog zaslona bezlične statistike; da su kotačići u ogromnoj i dehumanizirajućoj mašineriji koju ne mogu kontrolirati niti na nju mogu utjecati, a čiji im ciljevi i motivacije nisu zajednički; da multinacionalne korporacije, odane samo ulagačima i motivu profita, raspolažu većom gospodarskom moći nego nacionalne države (Mitsubishijeva ekonomija jača je od ekonomije npr. Saudijske Arabije, a zajedno s korporacijom General Motors i od Grčke, Norveške ili ekonomije Južne Afrike; zapravo s 50 od 100 najjačih ekonomija upravljaju multinacionalne korporacije, a ne države – čini se da zemlje postaju tek poštanski kodovi na slobodnom globalnom tržištu). Manje izražen vjerojatno je bio i još uvijek jest osjećaj da takva globalna aktivnost zanemaruje pojedinca, da brojke, dijagrami i zaključni računi vrijede više nego stvarna ljudska bića zbog kojih se tobože sve to radi. Sramotno vrijeđa osjećaj da je ljudsko dostojanstvo, zapravo identitet koji uključuje međusobne razlike identiteta - gurnut postrance. No, vratit ćemo se na to.

Mene ovdje zanima složeni međusobni odnos ili veza, gotovo dijalog a zasigurno recipročni odnos između globalizacije i nacionalizma. To je zapleteno zbog velike nejasnoće svih uključenih osnovnih pojmova: "globalizacija", "nacionalizam", Ťkultura", "multikulturalizam", te uz njih vezane pojmove poput "etnik", "rasa", "pleme", "država". Njih treba pažljivo iznijansirati. Najprije ću, međutim, bez nijansi i ugrubo ocrtati svakog od njih.

Globalizacija: izaziva pomisao na McDonalds, Levis, odjeću Nike, anonimnost i istovjetnost trgovačkih centara diljem svijeta; na multinacionalne korporacije; na WTO, MMF, Svjetsku banku, lutkice Barbie, američke filmove, Disneyjeve filmove koje gledaju djeca cijelog svijeta; na prodaju nogometnih igrača (prošle je godine momčad Chelsea, koja je među vrhunskim britanskim momčadima, najmanje jednom izašla na teren bez ijednog Engleza u svom sastavu); svakako na Internet i World Wide Web; posebice na status prezaduženosti zemalja u razvoju. Sve u svemu, iako veoma uopćeno: globalizacija uključuje tehnološku promjenu, porast globalne ekonomije, masovno povećanje moći ogromnih multinacionalnih korporacija, globalizaciju politike i izvjesnu globalizaciju ideja. Po nekim autorima, jedna ili dvije od tih stvari važnije su od drugih; interpretacije variraju. Navodim to samo kao grubu zajedničku jezgru kako bih uprizorila potpuniju raspravu. Pokušat ću tako napraviti i s  nacionalizmom.

Ako je "globalizaciju" teško opisati čak i u širokim crtama, "nacionalizam" je još teže. On je relativno novog datuma – sve do osamnaestog i devetnaestog stoljeća najčešće političke strukture, barem u Europi, bile su multinacionalna carstva i gradovi–države. Najveća je podjela među onima koji ga smatraju "fuj" pojmom, nečim lošim povezanim s rasizmom, ksenofobijom, šovinizmom; nečim što ima svoj izraz u tako pogubnim djelovanjima kao što je etničko čišćenje i genocid ili u relativno trivijalnim poput tučnjave između navijača Leedsa i Galatasaraya u Istanbulu. Za druge je to "hura" pojam vezan uz domoljublje, uz ponos pojedinca i idiosinkratičnost kulture u vidu jezika, postignuća, obilježja i posebnosti nacije; to je svaka nacionalna država s vlastitim središtem prema kojem gravitira; obično je to nešto vezano uz određeni dio zemaljske kugle, neko mjesto; ovisi o srodstvu – zajedničkim precima – i kolektivnom sjećanju (selektivnom prisvajanju povijesnih događaja kakvi su stvarno bili, romantizirano ili mitski); nešto što ovisi o pravnom sustavu i njegovu statusu iznad monarha, careva, političara; nacionalni osjećaj je nešto što osobama daje osjećaj identiteta, dostojanstva, vlastite vrijednosti i sigurnosti stvarajući kategorije unutar kojih definiramo sami sebe. On izražava naše prioritete, ambicije i vrijednosti koje mogu biti ne srazmjerne i uistinu nespojive s onima drugih država. On stvarno pretpostavlja razliku "mi/oni" – razliku koja može biti bezazlena ili koja se može izokrenuti u netrpeljivost i neprijateljstvo.

Ovo je veoma ugrubo ocrtana situacija. Postoji gotovo jednako toliko interpretacija nacionalizma koliko ima ljudi koji o njemu pišu; kao i slučaju globalizacije, neke će čimbenike zanemariti, a druge istaknuti. Ipak, apsolutno je ključno izbjeći esencijalizam: ideju da postoji jezgra i fiksirani skup obilježja, neka bit koja naciju čini onim što ona jest. Gotovo sve što spada u određivanje "nacije" i "kulture" razvija se i mijenja; institucije poput pravnog sustava vjerojatno najsporije, dok se navike, ukusi, konvencije (itd.) pojave, a zatim ih se preoblikuje i prepravlja.

Dakle, oba sam pojma ocrtala veoma širokim potezima. Zanima me kako nacionalizam može biti važan za globalizaciju i obrnuto – u kakvom su međusobnom odnosu. Razmotrimo stoga neke velike političke teoretičare i povijest političkih ideja.

Koliko god anakronistički bilo tako reći, prvo sjeme jedne ili dviju linija globalizacije nalazimo u zapisima nekih starih Grka; točnije, argument da određene ideje imaju univerzalnu snagu kroz cijelo čovječanstvo. Ti veliki intelektualni odličnici, Platon i Aristotel, smatrali su da prave sklonosti pomiješane s razumom mogu čovjeku jednostavno reći, i mogu reći svima, što je ispravno u ovoj ili onoj situaciji. Uvijek je postojao jedan pravi odgovor, iako ga je možda teško pronaći. To još nije bila globalizacija u krajnjem obliku; Aristotel je osobito uporno tvrdio da "pravi odgovor" ovisi o činitelju (agentu) i situaciji. On je poput Platona bio svjestan da ima mnogo konfliktnih političkih sustava; kao i Platon smatrao je da je samo jedan najbolji (a to sigurno ni za jednog od njih nije bila liberalna demokracija i niti jedan nije dovodio u pitanje ustrojstvo gradova–država u većem dijelu Grčke toga doba). Ipak, kao što je razum isti za sva normalna ljudska bića, tako nikada ne može postojati neko nerješivo neslaganje između ljudi koji daju prednost jednoj vrijednosti pred drugom: jedna ili obje moraju biti krive, usmjerene u pogrešnom smjeru ili loše upućene.

Krenemo li naprijed i preskočimo li nekoliko stoljeća, vidjet ćemo kako je to sjeme uspijevalo na drugom tlu: mnogi koji su pisali i razmišljali o tim stvarima u osamnaestom i devetnaestom stoljeću u Europi bili bi užasnuti nacionalizmom (osim vjerojatno kao prolaznom i žaljenja vrijednom fazom kroz koju je neki narod možda morao proći). Oni su željeli nešto otporno na predrasude, praznovjerje, sukob: poput Platona i Aristotela, željeli su ispravne odgovore o tome kako upravljati. Neke određene etičke teorije koje bi mogli otkritii i braniti. Podjela svijeta na nacionalne države trebala bi nestajati i biti zamijenjena novim svjetskim poretkom koji podsjeća na srednji vijek, s mješavinom regija i nacionalnih država koje zajedno više ili manje skladno ko-egzistiraju unutar nekoliko labavo povezanih globalnih institucija – suvremenih ekvivalenata srednjovjekovnom papinstvu i carstvima. Posve različito od suvremenih pobornika globalizacije, motivi ljudi onoga doba bili su u osnovi moralni. Oni su željeli ustanoviti što je odgovorno za nepravdu, ugnjetavanje, okrutnost, ropsku podložnost, siromaštvo, očaj; što je to bilo u ljudima da je izazvalo takva zla? Kao posljedica toga htjeli su znati kako postići suprotno: mir, istinoljubivost, pravdu, sigurnost, dostojanstvo, slobodu, osobnu autonomiju i ispunjenje. Rousseau i Tolstoj dvojica su od onih koji su tražili rješenje u nečemu što su smatrali da je gotovo djetinja jednostavnost neiskvarenog seljaka – uvijek više mitološkog nego stvarnog bića koje živi u idealiziranom selu, u Arkadiji; u ljudima nezaraženih pohlepom i egoizmom skrivenih iza duhovnog sljepila takozvane civilizacije. Neki su zastupali povratak prema (opet uglavnom mitskim) "vrijednostima predaka" iz prošlih naraštaja u zlatnom dobu. Neki su pak odgovore tražili u učenjima teologije. I opet bi jedan odgovor, koliko god složen, bio primijenjen na sva razumna bića. Nacionalizam, svojim ustrajanjem na različitosti i stvarno čestim neslaganjem ciljeva i vrijednosti, tu nije imao mjesto.

Međutim, više od svega, počeo se isticati znanstveni racionalizam: društvene i političke teorije utemeljene na stvarnoj teoriji povijesne promjene. Postojalo je sve veće i ogromno zanimanje za povijesna proučavanja, a doista se imalo što istraživati. Svakodnevni život dramatično se mijenjao zbog nove tehnologije i uspona velikih industrija. Sekularizacija renesanse i reformacija uzdrmale su vjerske institucije. Osobito su prirodne znanosti kročile velikim koracima i doimale se gotovo nezaustavljivima. (Utjecaj posebice Newtona teško je preuveličati: sjetimo se Alexandera Popea: "Priroda i prirodni zakoni počivaju skriveni u noći. / Bog reče: Neka bude Newton! I sve postade svjetlo.") Prirodne znanosti i politika, psihologija i etika bile su u osnovi jednako metodološki oblikovane, iako različitih tema – ništa nije usporedivo s "dvije kulture" C. P. Snowa. Općenito, dakle, prestiž prirodnih znanosti, koje su od renesanse tako naglo napredovale, doveo je do stvaranja opće vjere u ideju kako se isto može postići političkom, etičkom i psihološkom spekulacijom korištenjem moćnog novog alata koji je, činilo se, razotkrio tajne izvanjskog svijeta.

Condorcet je 1794. bio siguran da možemo primijeniti matematiku na socijalnu politiku i dobiti istinski opis najboljeg političkog sustava, a mi bismo potom trebali tek iznaći načine pomoću kojih ga je moguće ostvariti – za cjelokupno čovječanstvo. August Comte, njegov suradnik (i tajnik, jer Condorcet je pisao iz zatvora), vidio je put napredovanja u nekoj vrsti svjetovne religije, autoritarno organizirane u skladu s racionalnim (ne liberalnim ili demokratskim) idealima. Otada su se u posljednjem stoljeću dogodili brojni politički i društveni pokreti koji prelaze ili teže prijeći granice nacija-država, poput međunarodnog socijalizam, islama, fašizma, liberalne demokracije – svi su posvećeni monolitnim ideologijama i svi privlače ljude u velikom broju.

Te transnacionalne ideologije izazvale bi racionalnu i radikalnu reorganizaciju društva te bi velik skladan – i univerzalan – sustav mogao biti uspostavljen. Predrasude i praznovjerje gubili bi se i nestali; bio bi to kraj glupostima i okrutnostima tiranskih režima. Dakle: ustanovite osnovne ljudske potrebe i najbolje načine njihova zadovoljenja. Tu nacionalizmu ne bi bilo mjesta.

To je "globalizacija" u punom smislu riječi. Rješenja za svjetske probleme postoje; ta se rješenja mogu otkriti, ali samo je jedno ispravno rješenje, sva su ostala pogrešna. Razboritošću i primjenom racionalnih znanstvenih metoda možemo iznaći načine za ta rješenja; odgovor na taj društveni problem bit će u skladu s odgovorima na ovaj i na onaj problem… jer istina je jedna jedinstvena, pa jedna istina ne može biti nedosljedna drugoj.

Ispravnim poimanjem pravila koja upravljaju fizičkim i psihološko–društvenim svijetom možemo steći nazor o savršeno skladnom načinu života i početi ga ostvarivati. Samo intelektualna slabost – jer se nikada nije mislilo da je to lako – ili prirodna grešnost ili pokvarenost, mogu tome stajati na putu. U Britaniji su npr. Bentham i Macauley bili sigurni u ostvarivost takvog "čistog i dotjeranog" svijeta. Svakako, neki su – slažući se s osnovnim porivom – smatrali da to baš nije posve jednostavno. Za njih (Hegela i Marxa, primjerice) istina nije bila bezvremenska. Postoji povijesna promjena i razvoj; ljudske ambicije su se promijenile a napredak mogu zakočiti ratovi, revolucije, snažne pobune među nacijama, kulturama, klasama; može se dogoditi povratak barbarizmu i nacionalizmu. Ipak, na koncu bismo počeli postizati univerzalnu skladnu suradnju. Nacionalizam je postojao, ali to je bilo zastranjivanje, korak unatrag, a njegova propast tek je nedovršen posao. Marx je smatrao da će jednog dana međunarodne klasne lojalnosti nadvladati međuklasnu nacionalnu lojalnost. Bio je to izraz pretjeranog povjerenja; Marx bi bio duboko razočaran načinom na koji su se radnici okupili pod svojim nacionalnim zastavama u Prvom svjetskom ratu, a rat (u velikoj mjeri vođen radi izgradnje vladavine kapitalizma i gospodarske kontrole) nije trebao imati veze s međunarodnom radničkom solidarnošću.

Danas liberalni demokrati, među kojima je za mnoge nacionalizam također anatema, osobno smatraju – može se reći donekle s razlogom – da je njihova politička ideologija najbolja. Ili, barem, da je vjerojatno najmanje loša (kao što je rekao Winston Churchill). Ta je ideologija na posljetku porazila drugu ideologiju – komunizam. Njih dvije su se za vrijeme hladnog rata uglavnom smatrale suprotnim polovima divovske ideološke borbe za srca i duše. Liberalna demokracija vođena tržištem bila je jasno suprotstavljena globalnim ambicijama komunizma i poput njega težila je da bude globalna. Obje su imale neku vrstu misionarske gorljivosti. Ipak, ta potreba za superiornošću liberalne demokracije treba biti pažljivo određena. Može se raspravljati, i raspravljalo se, protiv liberalne demokracije – da će različite nacionalne države "liberalnu demokraciju" shvatiti na različite načine; da se liberalne ideje Zapada jednim dijelom zapravo temelje na prešutnoj netrpeljivosti prema nezapadnim vrijednostima; da je isticanje sloboda i ljudskih prava (kad su suprotstavljeni npr. jednakosti ili državnoj sigurnosti) za zemlje poput Kine, Izraela ili Bangladeša previše eurocentrično ili američkocentrično. Nadalje, među onima koji se opiru globalizaciji postoji osjećaj – čak i kad nisu nacionalisti u bilo kojem obliku ili smislu – da su građani kao pojedinci, a time sama demokracija, zanemareni u odnosu na sve veći gospodarski utjecaj multinacionalista, bezličnih birokrata u Bruxellesu, u Svjetskoj banci, MMF–u ili Svjetskoj trgovačkoj organizaciji. Ipak, iako otvoreno poricana, postoji ta temeljna (vjerojatno implicitna) pretpostavka da je nacionalni osjećaj u cijelosti nevažan i sekundarni faktor koji ne vrijedi uzeti u obzir osim kao nezgodnu smetnju u napretku liberalne demokracije. Danas nama upravljaju i trebaju upravljati multinacionalne institucije, a ne povijest i zemljopis. Postoji i treba postojati lagano povlačenje državne suverenosti pred tim globalnim institucijama kao što se nacionalne države povlače pred novim nadnacionalnim preustrojstvom zemaljske kugle.

Mnogi su, međutim, užasnuti tim prijenosom moći s odgovornih nacionalnih država na neodgovorne institucije i monolitski univerzalizam koji se njime potiče – a potiče ga zanemarivanje i gaženje lokalnih i nacionalnih lojalnosti i različiti pristupi stvarima. On pogađa izravno u srce identiteta pojedinca. Štoviše, čini se da je činjenično pogrešan – između 1990. i 2000. pojavilo se više od 20 novih suverenih država uz žestoko krvoproliće ili bez njega, od bivšeg SSSR-a, bivše Jugoslavije, od Čehoslovačke; tu su Eritreja, Istočni Timor ... itd. Naprosto se ne čini da su gradovi–države i transnacionalne strukture put u budućnost. Možda je Singapur izuzetak koji dokazuje pravilo, ali spomenimo Hong Kong, grad–državu koju je nedavno progutala nacionalna država. Nadalje, globalizacija se ne doima toliko amoralnom koliko pokatkad pozitivno nemoralnom: moralni razlozi jedva se ocrtavaju osim ako hipokrizija nije najdjelotvorniji način ostvarenja ciljeva koje globalizacija postavlja sama sebi. Na primjer: američko zauzimanje u Kuvajtu bila je "prava stvar" – Kuvajt je trebao izgubiti svoju nezavisnost na račun nasilnog susjeda. No, što je mnogo važnije: Kuvajt je imao naftu. Naprotiv, za vrijeme rata između Eritreje i Etiopije bilo je trenutaka kada se činilo da će Eritreju svladati veća i jača Etiopija; ali ni jedna zapadna zemlja nije ni prstom maknula. Nadalje, spomenut ću samo tri područja u kojima je motiv profita isključivao ili zanemarivao "ljudske" probleme u korist kratkoročnog gospodarskog dobitka, koliko god to bilo na uštrb potreba i interesa onih u najsiromašnijim zemljama.

 
Lecture held on May 22nd, 2001 in the Aula of the University of Zagreb

Dr. Kathleen Vaughan Wilkes

Globalization and Nationalism

A charming thought to start a rather depressing talk. Johann Gottfried von Herder, in 1791: “How wonderfully has Nature separated nations, not only by woods and mountains, seas and deserts, rivers and climates, but most particularly by languages, inclinations and characters, so that the work of subjugating despotism might be rendered more difficult...”

In the last few months we've seen a lot of protests against “globalization”. There was the “Battle in Seattle”, the riots in Washington; the fighting in Prague; and thus last Mayday there were demonstrations – some peaceful, some less so – in Berlin, Sydney, London, and dozens of other places.

Precisely what these protestors and demonstrators wanted to target is unclear. In London, for instance, there were: anarchists, looking for a fight, or to break into or occupy banks or government buildings (or simply to smash a few shop widows and do a bit of looting); those concerned with planetary pollution and traffic congestion; those concerned with the widening gap between the rich and the poor countries; with the IMF /World Bank treatment of developing countries; there were those from the Countryside Alliance as well as those who want to ban foxhunting, fishing, shooting; some were steelworkers made redundant, others concerned with corruption or sleaze in politics; human rights activists, pro-choice and pro-life campaigners; some angry about drug-related experiments on animals, others furious that drugs to alleviate the effects of the HIV virus were patented and too expansive for the AIDS-ridden African countries to buy and prescribe. (Because of the profit imperative of multinational pharmaceutical companies.) Many others thought that they were being left out of decision-making in Britain; or that Britain's independence, indeed its sovereignty, was being eroded by the clout of the European Union.

Many of the protesters seemed unsure of what they wanted; one banner red: “Get rid of capitalism. Replace it with something better”. Perhaps a common thread, a theme to which we will return, was a sensation of being counters in a game played elsewhere by invisible, unelected others, who were manipulating them behind the opaque shield of impersonal statistics; that they were cogs an a huge and dehumanising machinery which they could neither control nor influence, and whose ends and motivations were not theirs; that multinational corporations, loyal only to investors and to the profit motive, wielding more economic power than nation-states (Mitsubishi's economy is greater than that of, say, Saudi Arabia and  along with General Motors, is bigger than Greece, Norway, or South Africa; in fact 50 of the largest 100 economies in the world are run by multinational corporations, not by countries - countries seemed to be becoming nothing more than postcodes in the free global market.) More inchoately; perhaps, there was and is a feeling that such global activity ignores the individual; that figures and graphs and balance-sheets count for more than the actual human beings for whom this is ostensibly being done. An outraged sense that human dignity; indeed identity including identity in difference, is being sidelined. We'll come back to this.

My interest here is to look at the complex interrelationship or entanglement, almost a dialogue, certainly a reciprocal relationship, between globalization and nationalism. Now: this is made tricky because of the great fuzziness of all the key notions involved: “globalization”, “nationalism”, “culture”, “multiculturalism”, and notions related to these, such as “ethnic”, “race”, “tribe”, “state”. These call for careful nuancing. I shall first, however, give an unnuanced and crude sketch of each.

Globalization that brings to mind McDonalds, Levis, Nike clothes, anonymity and interchangeability of shopping-malls around the globe; multinational corporations; the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank; Barbie dolls, American films, Disney films watched by children the world over; the selling of footballers (last year the Chelsea team – which is one of the top British teams - on at least one occasion fielded a team with not one Briton in the side); of course the Internet and the World Wide Web; in particular, the debt-ridden status of developing countries. In sum, though, very generally: globalization seems to involve technological change, the rise of a global economy, a massive increase in the power of vast multinational corporations, the globalization of politics, and certain globalization of ideas. I suggest this only as rough common core, to set the stage for fuller discussion. Now I'll try to do the same for nationalism.

If “globalization” is hard to characterise, even in broad outline, “nationalism” is worse. It is relatively new - right up to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the most common political structures, in Europe at least, were the multinational empire and the city-state. The biggest divide is between those who see it as a “boo” notion, a bad thing, connected with racism, xenophobia, chauvinism; expressed in such serious activities as ethnic cleansing and genocide, or in relatively trivial ones, like Leeds and Galatasaray football fans fighting in Istanbul. To others it is a “hooray” term, allied to patriotism, to pride in the individual and idiosyncratic culture, in the forms of language, in the achievements, traits and quirks of the nation; each nation-state with its own centre of gravity; it is usually something bound to a specific part of the globe, a place dependent on kinship - shared ancestry - and collective memory (of a selective appropriation of historical events actual, romanticised, or mythological); dependent on the legal system and its standing above politicians, monarchs, emperors, politicians; national sentiment is something that gives individual a sense of identity, dignity, worth, and security, by supplying the categories within which we define ourselves. It expresses our priorities, ambitions, and values, which may be incommensurable and indeed incompatible with those in other nation-states. Indeed, it presupposes an “us/them” distinction - a distinction that can be benign, or which can turn into intolerance and hostility.

This, again, is very crude thumbnail sketch. There are almost as many interpretations of nationalism as there are people who write about it; as with globalization, some factors they will ignore, while highlighting others.  However, what is absolutely crucial is to avoid essentialism: the idea that there is a core and fixed set of features, an essence, which makes a nation what it is. Almost everything that goes to make up “a nation”, and indeed “a culture” evolves and changes; perhaps institutions, such as the system of law, most slowly, but habits, tastes, conventions (etc.) come and go, are remade and refashioned.

So: I've sketched both with a very broad brush. Now I want to see how nationalism can be relevant to globalization, and vice versa - how they interact. Let us therefore look at some of the major political theorists, and the history of political ideas.

Anachronistic as it may be to say so, we see early seeds of one or two of the strands of “globalization” in the writings of some of the ancient Greeks, in particular, the argument that certain ideas have universal force throughout mankind. Those great intellectual elitists, Plato and Aristotle, thought that good dispositions, infused with reason, could simply tell you, and could tell everyone, what was the right thing to do in this or that situation. There was always one right answer, even though it might be hard to find. This was not yet “globalization” in any extreme form; Aristotle in particular was insistent that “the right thing to do” was agent and situation - dependent. He, like Plato was well-aware that there were many conflicting political systems like Plato, though, he thought that one was the best (and that was certainly not liberal democracy, for either of them; and neither challenged the city-state structure of most of Greece at the time). However, just as reason was the same for all normal human beings. so there could never be an insoluble disagreement between people preferring one value to another, one or both must be wrong, misguided, or badly-informed.

Moving on and jumping several centuries, to see how this seed grew in other soil: many of those writing and thinking about these things in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in Europe, would have been horrified by nationalism (except perhaps as a passing regrettable phase through which, maybe, some people had to go). They wanted something immune to prejudice, superstition, conflict: like Plato and Aristotle, they wanted correct answers about the right way to run things. Some specific ethical theory that they could discover and defend. The world-divisions into nation states should fade away and be replaced by a new world-order reminiscent of the middle ages, with a miscellany of regions and nation states, co-existing more or less harmoniously under a few loose global institutions – the modern equivalents of the medieval papacy and empires. Very unlike modern supporters of globalization, then, the motives of these people were essentially moral. They wanted to discover what was responsible for injustice, oppressions, cruelty, servility, poverty, despair; what was it about humans that brought these evils about? As a corollary, they wanted to know how to bring about the opposite: peace, truthfulness, justice, security, dignity, freedom, personal autonomy, and fulfilment. Rousseau and Tolstoy are two of those who sought the solution in what they took to be almost child-like simplicity of the unspoilt peasant - always more of a mythological than an actual being, living in a village that was idealised, an Arcadia; people uncontaminated by the greed and egoism which lay behind the spiritual blindness of so-called civilisation. Some advocated a return to the (again largely mythical) “ancestral values” of last generations in a golden age. Others of course looked for answers in the teaching of theology. Again, one answer, however complex, would apply to all rational mankind. Nationalism, with its insistence on the diversity, and indeed the frequent incompatibility, of ends and values had no place here.

Above all, though, there came an emphasis on scientific rationalism: social and political theories that would be founded on a true theory of historical change. There was an increasing, and huge, interest in historical studies; and indeed there was much to examine. Everyday life was being changed dramatically by new technology and the rise of large industries. The secularism of the Renaissance, and the Reformation, had shaken religious institutions. Above all, the natural sciences were making huge strides, and seemed well-nigh unstoppable. (The impact of Newton in particular is impossible to exaggerate: see Alexander Pope - “Nature, and Nature's laws, lay hid in night. / God said: Let Newton be! and all was light.”) The natural science, and politics, psychology, and ethics were essentially from the same methodological mould, albeit with different subject-matters – there could be noting like C. P, Snow's “two cultures”. Generally, then, the prestige of the natural sciences, which had progressed so rapidly since the Renaissance, led to a general faith in the idea that the same could be done with political, ethical, and psychological speculation, by using the powerful new tools which seemed to have revealed the secrets of the external world.

Condorcet, in 1794, was sure that we can apply mathematics to social policy, to get the one, true description of the best political system; and then we just have to find ways by means of which it can be realised – for all mankind. His collaborator (and secretary, Condorcet wrote from prison) Auguste Comte saw a species of secular religion, organised in an authoritarian way in accordance with rational (not liberal or democratic) ideals as the way forward. Since then, we have seen in the last century numbers of political and social movements that transcend, or purport to transcend, nation-states – such as international socialism, Islam, Fascism, liberal democracy – all dedicated to monolithic ideologies, all attracting vast numbers of people.

These transnational ideologies would bring about a rational and radical reorganization of society; and a great harmonious – and universal - system could be established. Prejudice and superstition would dwindle and vanish; there would be an end to the stupidities and cruelties of oppressive regimes. Just: find the basic human needs, and the best means of satisfying them. There would be no room for nationalism here.

This is “globalisation” with vengeance. There are solutions to the world's problems; those solutions can be discovered; there is only one correct solution, all the rest being erroneous, we can with reason and the application of rational scientific methods find the ways to those solutions; the answer to this social problem will be compatible with answers to that one, and this one… for truth is a single whole, and one truth cannot be inconsistent with another.

With a correct understanding of the rules that guide the physical and the psychological-social world, we can have a view of a perfectly harmonious way of life, and set out to realise it. Only intellectual weakness – because it was never thought to be easy – or natural sinfulness or corruption, can stand in the way. In Britain, Bentham and Macauley, for instance, were sure of realizability of such a “swept and garnished” world. Certainly, some – while agreeing with the main thrust – thought it would not be quite so simple. For them  (Hegel and Marx, for example) truth was not timeless. There is historical change and development; human ambitions changed, and progress could be set back by wars, revolutions, violent upheavals between nations, cultures, classes; there could be return to barbarism and nationalism. But, eventually, we would begin to get universal harmonious cooperation. Nationalism was there, but was an aberration, a throwback; and its overthrow is just unfinished business. Marx thought that one day international class loyalties would prevail over inter-class national loyalty. This was overconfident; he would have been sadly disappointed by the way that workers flocked to the side of their national flags in World War I; the war (to a large extent concerned with capitalist empire-building and economic control) should have been something that had nothing to do with international worker solidarity.


Today; liberal democrats, for many of whom nationalism is also anathema, for their part think - with some reason, it may be said – that theirs is the best political ideology. Or, at minimum, that it is probably the least bad (as Winston Churchill put it). Qua ideology it has, after all, defeated another ideology - communism. The two were widely seen, during the cold war, as opposite poles of a titanic ideological struggle for hearts and minds. Liberal market-driven democracy was explicitly opposed to the global ambitions of communism, and, like it, did indeed seek to be global. Both had a sort of missionary zeal. However, this claim for the superiority of liberal democracy has to be carefully qualified. It can be, and has been, argued against liberal democracy that various nation-state will understand “liberal democracy” in various ways; that the liberal ideas of the West in fact rest in part on an implicit intolerance of non-Western values; that the stress on liberty and human rights (when set against equality, or state security, for instance) is too Eurocentric, or American-centric, for countries such as China, Israel, or Bangladesh. Furthermore, there is a feeling amongst those resistant to globalization -even if they are not nationalists in any shape or form – that the individual citizens, and hence democracy itself. are being sidelined by the ever-increasing economic clout of the multinationals, by the faceless bureaucrats in Brussels, in the World Bank, the IMF, or the World Trade Organisation. All the same, there is this underlying (perhaps implicit) assumption, even if overtly denied: that national sentiment is by and large, an unimportant and secondary factor, not worth taking into consideration except as an irritating complication on the progress of liberal democracy. Multinational institutions, rather than history or geography, now do and should govern us. There is and should be a steady surrender of state sovereignty to these global institutions, as nation-states retreat before the new supranational restructuring of the globe.

Many, though, are horrified by this transfer of power from accountable nation-states to global and unaccountable institutions and the monolithic universalism it fosters – fosters, by simply ignoring or trampling underfoot local or national loyalties and the variety of ways of doing things. It directly hits at the heart of an individual's identity. What is more, it seems to be factually false – between 1990 and 2000 more than 20 new sovereign states have appeared, with or without violent bloodshed, from he former USSR, the former Yugoslavia, from Czechoslovakia, we find Eritrea; East Timor … etc. City-states and transnational structures just don't seem to be the way of the future Maybe Singapore is the exception that proves the rule; but consider Hong Kong: a city-state recently absorbed by a nation-state. Further, globalization seems not so much amoral as sometimes positively immoral: moral considerations barely feature, unless lip service to them is the most efficient way of realizing the ends that globalization sets itself. For example: America's engagement in Kuwait was “the right thing to do” – Kuwait was about to lose its independence to a bullying neighbour. But far more importantly: Kuwait had oil. By contrast, during the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, there was a time when it seemed that Eritrea was to be overwhelmed by the larger and stronger Ethiopia; but no Western country raised a finger. To take this further, I shall look at just three areas where the profit motive can be seen as ignoring or dismissing long term and “human” concerns in favour of short term economic gain, at whatever cost to needs and interests of those in the poorest countries.



The ceremony at the University of Zagreb



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