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| Kathy Wilkes Dr Honoris Causa of the University of Zagreb 2001 |
| By Prof.Dr. Darko Zubrinic |
Published
07/4/2012
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Kathy Wilkes at the University of Zagreb in 2001, part 2
Zamislite najprije kojom brzinom zemlje mogu ulagati i prestati ulagati u zemlje u razvoju – ogromne količine kapitala (procijenjenog na oko 1.500 milijardi dolara dnevno u vanjskoj trgovini) mogu obići oko Zemlje tek "klikom" na tipku kompjutora. To može razoriti zemlje u razvoju. Kada se za Indoneziju mislilo da je potencijalni gospodarstveni "tigar" Istoka, ulaganja su pritjecala. Kad su se banke uznemirile zbog visine duga, ulaganja su presahnula gotovo preko noći. Dioničari su slijedili svoj instinkt krda i zajednički su se povukli. Cijene azijskih dionica su pale, a tečaj je obezvrijeđen. Plan spašavanja MMF–a bio je brz i nesmiljen; veliki zajmovi, svakako, ali uz potraživanja nametnuta tim zemljama bez osvrtanja na narav društva i njegove potrebe, čime su se posve zanemarile bilo kakve društvene posljedice nametnute politike. Točnije, provedena je prisilna privatizacija, a za povrat duga nametnut je strog vremenski raspored. Rezultat: u Indoneziji je privremeno otpušteno 20 milijuna ljudi. Četvrt milijuna klinika moralo se zatvoriti, UNICEF je procijenio da će smrtnost djece skočiti 30%. Više od 6 milijuna djece napustilo je škole. Prema procjeni OXFAM-a (međunarodna organizacije Oxford Committee for Famine Relief) više od 100 milijuna Indonežana živi u siromaštvu – četiri puta više nego što je to bilo 1995. Još je jedna posljedica: u mnogim se pogođenim zemljama beznađe pretvorilo u rasno prinošenje žrtava. U Indoneziji su prodavaonice etničkih Kineza trgovaca bile opljačkane i spaljene; skupine nasilnika premlaćivale su i ubile stotine Kineza. U Maleziji su teret rasizma podnijeli Židovi: bili su okrivljeni za destabilizaciju zemlje.
Ovdje vidimo lošu stranu nacionalizma koji pojačava (ali ne započinje) razaranje kakvo su izazvali uvjeti nametnuti od MMF-a. Kad god postoje pobjednici i gubitnici, gubitnici su uvijek najprije zemlje koje se bore sa siromaštvom.
Razlika (sve veća) između bogatih i siromašnih zemalja poslužit će mi kao drugi povezani primjer. Uzmimo sasvim nedavni slučaj. Prije tjedan dana mogli ste zapaziti da na tržištu kave postoji višak i kako se uzgajivačima kave (većinom iz siromašnih zemalja, na sitnim posjedima) cijena kave prepolovila – 2 dolara za kilu 1999.– 2000., a 1 dolar za kilu 2000.–2001. Za tipičnog malog zemljoposjednika u Tanzaniji vrijednost glavnog uroda kave (od 30 grmova) spala je s 13 funti prošle godine na 6,21 funtu ove godine. Farmeri u Latinskoj Americi bili su poticni na uzgoj kave (umjesto unosne koke) i obećana su im početna sredstva; otuda povećanje zaliha kave. No prijelazna sredstva zapravo se nisu pojavila; tako su oni, naravno, propali i vratili su se ili u bili u iskušenju vratiti na svoj već isprobani uzgoj koke.
Ipak, bogati zapadnjaci i dalje plaćaju 2,70 dolara za šalicu kave u Starbucksu, a direktor je iskazao dobitak od 40% u prvom tromjesečju 2001.; uzgred rečeno, on sam sebi isplaćuje 1,5 milijuna dolara godišnje. Bilanca profita mu je zapanjujuća, a njegovi dioničari su prezadovoljni. Mogla bih reći i više o tom skandalu s kavom, ali vrijeme je ograničeno. Smisao je samo pokazati kako jaz između bogatih i siromašnih zemalja raste sve više. Prosječni dohodak per capita u podsaharskoj Africi, nakon dva desetljeća Ťstrukturalnih podešavanjať od strane MMF–a i Svjetske banke, niži je nego 1970. No, suprotstavimo im bogate zemlje: koncentracija ekonomske moći u rukama multinacionalnih korporacija, odgovornih samo svojim dioničarima, u ogromnoj je mjeri povećala njihovo bogatstvo. Stanovništvo bogatih zemalja imalo je 1960. godine 30 puta veći dohodak nego ono u najsiromašnijim zemljama. Do 1997. jaz se povećao 74 puta. Niti sredstva MMF–a i Svjetske banke nisu dobro iskorištena. Procijenjeno je da je četvrtina od gotovo 500 milijardi dolara potpore Trećem svijetu u 2000. godini otišla kao podrška diktatorima u nekih 25 zemalja. Moguće je još i gore: mnoge zemlje bile su prisiljene utrošiti mnogo više na vraćanje dugova nego što su primile u zajmovima. Kao rezultat toga, između 1990. i 1997. netotransfer iz zemalja u razvoju u razvijene zemlje iznosio je 77 milijardi dolara. To smatram šokantnim, štoviše sramotnim.
Ponekad, istina je, neke nadnacionalne institucije prihvate problem svjetskog siromaštva kao globalni problem koji treba globalno riješiti – i pretpostavljam da bismo mogli pomisliti da je riječ upravo o tome i da bi se globalizacija upravo tu trebala pokazati u dobrom svjetlu. UN su 1990. godine uvele kategoriju Ťnajmanje razvijenih zemaljať s nešto više od 20 nabrojenih zemalja. Pametni ljudi u Svjetskoj banci, WTO-u i MMF-u izradili su pakete za pomoć, ali svaki od njih imao je krute i kulturalno slijepe uvjete – globalni odgovor na globalni problem. Rezultat? Nakon deset godina, 2000. godine, broj zemalja na popisu više se nego udvostručio – dosegao je broj 49. Nadalje, nije jasno je li ta promašena strategija prihvaćena iz nekih posebnih razloga. Beznadno siromašni ljudi ne mogu sebi priuštiti da se ponašaju kao pravi, efikasni potrošači, pa će uvoz u njihove zemlje drastično pasti. Da su se pametni kalkulanti sa Zapada zamislili o karakterističnim obrascima i načinima života tih nezapadnih nacija – drugim riječima, da su gledali kroz naočale umjerenog nacionalizma i shvatili ga, tada bi željezna šaka profitom vođene globalizacije mogla biti blaža, a rezultat je lako mogao biti smanjenje siromaštva. No čini se da su potrošački zahtjevi i traženje brzog profita bile jedine motivacije koje globalizacija priznaje.
Treće, razmislite o učinku globalizacije na okoliš, osobito s posljedicama koje ima na građane najsiromašnijih nacija – pljačkanje ogromnog i jeftinog blaga sirovina. Složila bih se da se uništavanje prašume, pretvaranje u pustinju dotad produktivne zemlje, pretjerani ribolov u jezerima, rijekama i obalnim vodama, nestajanje prirodnih habitata ugroženih vrsta događalo i prije nego su multinacionalisti doista počeli iskorištavati nacije u razvoju zbog jeftinih prirodnih dobara. Priznajem, postoje naznake zabrinutosti – globalno zatopljenje, primjerice, brine svakoga izuzev Georgea W. Busha. No iskorištavanje tih prirodnih izvora, koji se ne mogu obnoviti kako bi neki optimisti htjeli da vjerujemo, nikada prije nije bilo tako nemilosrdno.
Međunarodna proizvodnja izjeda prirodna bogatstva zemalja u razvoju a ekosustavi i habitati nestaju zabrinjavajućom brzinom. Kako sam napomenula prije, kruti uvjeti pod kojima MMF i Svjetska banka daju svoje zajmove te raspored njihova otplaćivanja stvaraju dodatne probleme. Siromašne zemlje moraju podmiriti dugovanja prije nego što tim sredstvima riješe vlastite potrebe: ceste, škole, bolnice (i skupe lijekove), zbrinjavanje onih koji su ostali siročad zbog AIDS-a ili jednostavno preživljavanje najsiromašnijih. Njihova je jedina opcija – jer uvjeti MMF/Svjetske banke ostavljaju malo mogućnosti ili nijednu – pojačati uništavanje kopna, rijeka i mora kako bi još više prodali na svjetsko tržište. Međutim, javlja se prezasićenost, prevelika ponuda i cijene padaju. Dakle, dvostruko više treba izvoziti kako bi se zaradio jednak iznos u stranoj valuti. Multinacionalnim korporacijama ide sasvim dobro. Njihovi dugovi su riješeni, profiti rastu, dioničari su zadovoljni a inflacija se drži pod kontrolom. (Sjetite se prijašnjeg primjera s kavom.) Ipak, to nije slobodna trgovina. Slobodu imaju multinacionalne korporacije. Gubitnici su i opet zemlje u razvoju, s opustošenim šumama, pesticidima zatrovanim priobaljem, iscrpljenim lovištima ribe. U Džakarti je prošle godine u 70% uzoraka vode dokazan visok stupanj kemijskog onečišćenja, a 30% šuma u Sarawaku je nestalo. Primjeri bi se mogli beskonačno umnožavati.
Sasvim odvojeno od ugroženosti divljih životinja i činjenice da postoji globalno zatopljenje (itd.) zamjećujemo uništavanje ili opasnost od uništenja načina života, tradicija, elemenata plemenske ili nacionalne kulture. Ribarska naselja u dijelovima Azije postala su sablasno prazna: nema kupaca jer onečišćene vode i pretjerano ribarenje znače da više nema ribe. Zbog toga očajni ljudi pokušavaju emigrirati.
Za temeljitije razmatranje kako na to reagira nacionalizam i kako to može zaustaviti, vratimo se u osamnaesto i devetnaesto stoljeće. Znanstveni racionalizam onih poput Condorceta ili Benthama duboko su uznemirili Milla i Tocquevillea uglavnom iz istih razloga kao što je poslije strah od njegovih posljedica u odnosu na društvenu kontrolu hranio satiričke Utopije Orwella i Huxleyja. Carlyle, Ruskin, Disraeli, Thoreau i Fourier osjećali su prema njemu odbojnost ili su ga žestoko napadali. Nemir ili odbojnost bili su izazivani smislom sadržanim u ideji "jedan pravi put do samo jednog pravog cilja"; društvena kontrola bila bi ozakonjena, a pojedinac sveden samo na šahovsku figuru u toj igri. Ako je cilj određen, i to određen (u današnjem svijetu) od nepoznatih stranaca koji nisu izravno odgovorni, onda jedino što je preostalo jest pronaći najdjelotvorniji način postizanja tog cilja. Primjedba Ťznanstvenomť planu ostvarenja ljudskog dobra kako ga vide Condorcet ili Bentham bila je da pojedincu nije ostavljena mogućnost izbora, prostor za imaginaciju, za raspravljanje o ciljevima i temeljnim vrijednostima. On je trebao biti manipuliran za neki ideal u čijem stvaranju nije imao udjela, žrtvovan na oltar apstrakcija. To su Orwell i Huxley tako ogorčeno i briljantno napali. To je užasnulo tako mnogo ljudi kada su postale jasne prave ambicije biheviorizma; obratite pozornost na to da je naslov jedne od knjiga B. F. Skinnera IZVAN slobode i dostojanstva, a gotovo jedina značajna razlika između njegove utopije u Walden Two i utopija Orwella i Huxleyja jest ta što on doista misli da je to idealan svijet.
Prema pesimistu, pojedinac iz bilo koje zemlje – zahvaljujući nekontroliranoj globalizaciji – danas nije u boljoj situaciji nego što su bila imaginarna bića u tim utopijskim satirama. On je samo još jedna karika u lancu, i to zamjenjiva karika: motiv profita zahtijeva jeftin rad, a ne mari radi li se o Indonežaninu, Filipincu, Meksikancu, Afrikancu. Ako je potrebno što jeftinije proizvoditi obuću Nike, nogometne lopte ili zatvarače za boce, tada treba prenijeti posao u Bangladeš radije nego u Kaliforniju – u Bangladešu će se složiti s manje od 2 dolara na sat. Ima li izgleda da bi radnici na Filipinima pristali potkopati Bangladešane, u redu, posao će se prebaciti tamo. Radnici kao pojedinci jednostavno su sredstvo za postizanje cilja profita. To izravno negira najosnovniju Kantovu temu: središte njegova etičkog sustava jest da se ljudi ne smiju smatrati tek sredstvom, već ih uvijek treba priznavati kao ciljeve same po sebi. Nesposobnost shvaćanja značenja koje to ima vodi u bestidnu eksploataciju; to je zaista "izvan" slobode i dostojanstva.
Isaiah Berlin nalazi u Machiavelliju nekoga tko je jednostavno zanijekao da su ciljevi ili vrijednosti jedinstveni i univerzalni. Baš Machiavellija izabrao je iz osobnih razloga; Machiavelli je slučajno bio prvi kojeg je pročitao, a da je uzdrmao njegovu vjeru u dominantne monolitske poglede na nešto što je slično ili je proizišlo iz Platonovog ideala Ťjednog pravog državnog sustavať; univerzalnog i svuda valjanog. U Machiavelliju nalazimo "rimski" način života koji zagovara hrabrost, domišljatost, ponos, sposobnost iskorištavanja prilika, političko lukavstvo, spremnost na primjenu sile – odlike lava i lisice usmjerenih na moć i slavu državne politike. Suprotno tome i u neskladu s tim jest pojam kršćanskih vrlina: poniznost, prihvaćanje trpljenja, samo–žrtvovanje, krotkost, duhovna usmjerenost, usredotočenost na savršenstvo života pojedinca. On nije rekao da je netko pravedan, iskren, besprijekornog ponašanja, a netko drugi nepravedan, lažan, nepriličnog ponašanja. Nije teško zaključiti kakva je osoba njemu draža, ali nema jedinstvenog kriterija koji između njih odlučuje na temelju ičeg drugog do istine. Ipak, ne može ih se kombinirati; njihove su vrijednosti nezdružive.
Misli poput ove postale su sve utjecajnije vodeći pokatkad ravno u kulturalni relativizam. O kulturama se – što god da je obuhvaćeno tim škakljivim izrazom – ne može suditi kao o "ispravnim", "neispravnim", "lošim" ili "dobrim". Svako društvo ima svoj obrazac, vlastitu viziju stvarnosti (svijeta oko sebe), vlastite prirode, svojih ciljeva ili sudbine. To se iskazuje u svemu što ljudi u toj zajednici rade,
misle, osjećaju ili kažu. To nadahnjuje masovnu odanost u mjeri u kojoj to ne mogu nadnacionalne institucije. Španjolac će se boriti ako je Španjolska napadnuta, ali nije vjerojatno da će se izlagati opasnosti za Europsku zajednicu. On može ponosno stajati za vrijeme španjolske nacionalne himne, ali neće čak ni prepoznati Ťhimnu EZť. Štoviše, te vizije mogu biti neusporedive ili uzajamno isključive (kao što je to s Machiavellijevim "rimskim" i Ťkršćanskimť vrijednostima). Stoga je povučena razlika između prirodne znanosti (kako su je tada shvaćali) i humanističke znanosti; dogma da sveukupno znanje tvori jedinstvenu cjelinu Ťbez šavovať odbačena je. Iako utopije mogu poticati imaginaciju, one su opasne i navode na pogrešne zaključke; srećom, uz ljudsku prirodu kakva ona jest potpuno su neostvarive. Ipak, ne treba ići tako daleko u relativizam. Bolje je to nazvati Ťpluralizmomť. Razlika u odnosu na relativizam postoji tek zbog ograničenja naše opće ljudske prirode – ona ograničavaju raspon shvatljivih opcija.
Može postojati neograničen broj različitih biljaka u šumi, ali sve one pripadaju jednoj šumi i ovise o istom tlu. To govori, što čini se nije slučaj s relativizmom, da možemo – bez potrebe da dijelimo ili da nam se dopadaju vrijednosti koje susrećemo u drugim društvima – barem postići (vjerojatno s naporom) razumijevanje tih vrijednosti i vidjeti koju ulogu imaju u tkivu toga društva. Elegantni kozmopoliti Pariza devetnaestog stoljeća mogli bi, uz napor, razumjeti svijet u kojem su živjeli Homerovi ratnici.
Sve dosad imali smo argument za odbacivanje jedne verzije globalizacije, verzije koju bi odbili, ili tvrde da je odbijaju, i oni suvremeni političari koji podržavaju i podupiru stavove globalizacije; to je ideologija s jakim oblikom kulturalnog monizma. Ipak, upamtite, nama ne trebaju različiti nacionalni osjećaji da bi nam nešto dokazali. Veoma je važno uočiti da postoje drugi oblici zajednica, a uz većinu njih moguće je obraniti prije spomenute antiglobalizacijske argumente: klanovi, plemena, društva – čak i organizacije poput mafije – gradovi, pokrajine, kolonije prostranog carstva.
Mnoge vjerske skupine imaju kohezivni i samodostatni način života, kako god neobično to izgledalo nekome izvana; sjetite se zatvorenih amiških zajednica u Sjevernoj Americi u kojima se govorilo njemački.
Čak i vjerske zajednice koje zapravo ne dijele fizički teritorij mogu imati ujednačene kulturalne nazore koji su za njih od prvenstvene važnosti i govore o većini njihovih aktivnosti – mogući primjeri su Jehovini svjedoci ili kršćanski scijentisti. Islamski fundamentalizam veoma je univerzalan; neki ortodoksni muslimani u gradu Bradfordu (Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo) bili su jednako razjareni "bogohulnom" knjigom "Sotonski stihovi" Salmana Rushdija kao i muslimanski svećenici u Iranu.
Nadalje, kolonije carstava na vrhuncu moći bile su uglavnom zadovoljne s nedostatkom nacionalne svijesti jer je mnoge ionako nikada nisu ni imale, a njihova kulturalna raznolikost mogla je kao i prije nalaziti svoj izraz u podnacionalnom grupiranju s vlastitim načinom djelovanja, vlastitim vjerskim tradicijama, vlastitim jezicima, vlastitim teritorijem – što su razumna carstva mudro dopuštala. ("Uglavnom" stoga što je na svim tim mjestima uvijek bilo nacionalista baš kao što ih ima i danas u državama koje su sastavni dio Britanije (Škotska, Wales i Sjeverna Irska), u Baskiji u Španjolskoj, pokrajini Quebec i mnogim drugima.) Nenacionalističke spone i privrženosti mogu stvoriti uvjete potrebne za postizanje ljudskog dostojanstva i integriteta. Zato je još važnije objasniti nacionalistički osjećaj.
Pogledajmo osamnaesto i devetnaesto stoljeće. Značajna su bila otkrića i potreba izrade zemljovida. Istraživači su se vraćali donoseći novosti o različitim narodima, različitim kraljevstvima i carstvima, različitim etničkim grupacijama i vjerskim tradicijama; novosti o raznim načinima na koje su organizirana druga društva. Putnici su tako pridonosili upotpunjavanju zemljovida koje su i sami trebali.
Zajednice – nacije, kraljevstva – koje su opisivali morale su se na zemljovidu donekle razlikovati od onih susjednih po razlikama među tim zajednicama utemeljenim na etničkim, vjerskim, srodničkim obilježjima, od kojih su neka stvarala neprijateljstvo jedne grupe prema nekoj susjednoj. Nadalje, neki običaji koje su zatekli prilično su ih iznenadili. Herodot je iznio jedan od prvih primjera. Opisao je kako su grčki istraživači sreli pripadnike nekog indijanskog plemena. Nekako su se uspjeli s njima sporazumjeti. Indijanci su bili istinski užasnuti običajem Grka da svoje roditelje spaljuju na obrednoj lomači. Za njih je jedini način izražavanja dužne počasti bio da ih s poštovanjem pojedu.
Ratovi (i prijetnje ratom od susjednih nacija) veoma su značajni za izgradnju osjećaja nacionalnog jedinstva. Kad su se počele koristiti građanske vojske, prije Napoleonovih ratova, mnoge ako ne i većinu napada na druge države vodili su službeni zastupnici uz pomoć plaćenika. (Većinu tih bitaka na britanskoj strani u američkom ratu za nezavisnost vodili su plaćenici.) Kako bi se oduprle velikim Napoleonovim ambicijama, nacije su se morale združiti i odbiti prijetnju. To nije podrazumijevalo samo regrutaciju u svim dijelovima zemlje nego i određivanje poreza na razini nacije radi financiranja borbe. Nacionalne vojske okupile su muškarce iz svake "podređene" društvene grupacije; izmiješali su se sjevernjaci s južnjacima, gradsko i seosko stanovništvo, oni iz pokrajina s onima iz glavnog grada, pripadnici svake društveno-ekonomske skupine, svake ili ni jedne religije. Podređene lojalnosti bile su upravo takve – podređene nacionalnoj lojalnosti koja je u trenucima krize kakvi su snašli zemlju istisnula sve ostale veze. Suvremeni britanski porez na prihod (bilo je poreza i prije) datira od Pitta Mlađeg, a uveden je na razini nacije upravo za financiranje unapređenja vojske i mornarice. Takvo oporezivanje pretpostavlja mnogo više informacija o populaciji u cjelini, pa se tako započinje stvaranje popisa stanovništva.
Napoleon nije bio jedini koji je želio stvoriti carstvo. Za mnoge Europljane ostatak svijeta trebao je biti koloniziran, velikim dijelom u interesu iskorištavanja – izrabljivanje slabije razvijenih naroda postoji u svim političkim ideologijama, a europski trgovci toga doba najgorljivije su podupirali težnju za kolonizacijom. To je značilo ne samo pronaći tko je gdje (opet zemljovidi), kako bi se osnovale kolonije, nego je trebalo znati koje europske snage svojataju susjedna područja – jagma za Afriku sramna je ilustracija toga. Primjenjivani model kolonizacije bio je europski: stvarani su centralizirani glavni gradovi, kraljevine, kneževine, ili su dotad relativno autonomna plemena spajana zajedno kao što je bilo npr. u Indiji ili na Malajskom poluotoku. Kako bi se to olakšalo, izrađena je infrastruktura cesta, željezničkih putova i komunikacije. Također radi lakše kontrole proglašen je jedan "službeni" jezik, uglavnom naravno engleski, francuski, portugalski, španjolski itd., što je zatim pretpostavljalo stvaranje novih obrazovnih sustava.
Crtanje zemljovida, bilo da je uključivalo brisanje prešutno zacrtanih linija između kneževina ili plemena ili crtanje novih oštrijih linija oko "države", presijecalo je elemente koje smatramo sastavnim dijelovima nacionalizma. Vidjeli smo moguće značenje privrženosti religijskom identitetu; čuli smo o panarapskom nacionalizmu. Jednako je tako važno i pomaže objasniti sadašnju groznu borbu u dijelovima Afrike to što su mnoge tamošnje države umjetne tvorevine britanskih ili francuskih kolonijalnih administratora i presijecaju afričke etničke nacije. Tako npr. imamo krvave sukobe u Ruandi i Burundiju između Tutsija i Hutua – to su politički ostaci europskog kolonijalizma.
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Consider, first, the speed with which countries can invest and disinvest in developing countries – huge amounts of capital (estimated at about $ 1,500 billion daily, in foreign trading) can ricochet around the globe with a click of a computer button. This can devastate developing countries. When Indonesia was thought to be one of the potential “tiger” economies of the East, investment poured in. When banks became nervous about the level of debt it drained out again, almost overnight. Shareholders followed their herd instinct, and pulled-out in droves. Asian stock prices plummeted, and their currencies were devalued. The IMF's rescue-plan was swift and brutal; large loans, sure, but with demands imposed upon the countries concerned that ignored the nature of the society in question and its needs, and so entirely disregarded any of social consequences of the policies which it imposed. In particular, enforced privatisation; a strict timetable imposed for debt-repayment. The result: in Indonesia 20 million people were laid off. A quarter of a million clinics had to close; UNICEF estimated that infant mortality would jump by 30%. More than 6 million children dropped out of school. Oxfam estimated that more than 100 million Indonesians were living in poverty - four times more than there were in 1995. Another consequence: in many of the countries affected, desperation turned to racial scape-goating. In Indonesia the shops of ethnic Chinese merchants were looted and burned; gangs of thugs beat and killed hundreds of Chinese. In Malaysia the Jews bore the brunt of racism: they were blamed for destabilizing the country.
Here we see the bad side of nationalism reinforcing (not, however, initiating) the devastation wrought by the IMF-imposed conditions. When there are winners and losers, the losers are always countries that are struggling with poverty to start with.
The (increasing) difference between rich and poor countries is my second, related, example. Take a very recent case. You may have seen, a week ago, that there is a glut on the coffee-market, how coffee-farmers (mostly from poor countries, on tiny smallholdings) have seen the price of coffee cut in half - $2 per kilo in 1999-2000, $1 per kilo in 2000-2001. One typical smallholder in Tanzania saw the value of her main crop (of 30 bushes) fall: from Ł13 last year to Ł6,21 this year. Farmers in Latin America were encouraged to grow coffee (instead of the profitable coca), and were promised start-up funds, thus an increase in the coffee glut. Yet no transitional funds actually appeared; so – of course – they are out of business; returning, or tempted to return, to heir tried-and-tested coca crop.
Yet the wealthy westerner still pays Ł2.70 for one cup at Starbucks, and the managing director reported a 40% profit in the first quarter of 2001; incidentally, he pays himself Ł1,5m. per annum. His profit balance is astonishing, his shereholders well-content. There’s more I could say about this coffee scandal, but there is no time. The point is simply to show how the gulf between rich and poor countries is growing. The average per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa, after two decades of IMF and World Bank “structural adjustments” is lower than it was in 1970. Yet contrast the richer countries: the concentration of economic power in the hands of multinational corporations, accountable only to their shareholders, has massively increased their wealth. In 1960 people in the rich countries had 30 times more income than those in the poorest countries. By 1997 the gap had widened to 74 times more. Nor are the IMF or World Bank funds well-used. It has been estimated that a quarter of the nearly $500 billion of grants to the Third World in 2000 went to prop-up dictators in some 25 countries. Perhaps even worse: many countries were forced to spend far more on servicing their debts that they received in loans. The result is that between 1990 and 1997 there was a net transfer from developing to developed nations of $77 billion between 1990 and 1997. This I find shocking; indeed, obscene.
Sometimes, it is true, some of the supranational institutions take on the world poverty problem as a global problem needing a global solution – and, certainly, I guess that we would think that it is precisely that, and is just where globalization should be able to show itself in a good light. In 1990 the UN introduced a category of “least developed countries”, with just over 20 countries listed. Clever people in the World Bank, the WTO, and the IMF produced rescue packages, each of course with its stringent and culture-blind conditions – a global response to a global problem. The result? 10 years later, in 2000, the number of countries on the list had more than doubled, to 49. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this failed strategy was adopted for any particularly sensible reasons. Desperately poor people can’t afford to behave like proper, efficient consumers, so imports to their countries will drop off drastically. If the clever Western number-crunchers had stopped to think about the characteristic patterns and ways of life of these non-Western nations – in other words, if they had looked through the spectacles of, or understood, a moderate nationalism – then the iron fist of profit-driven globalization could have been tempered, and the result might easily have been a diminution of poverty. However, consumer demand and short-term profit-seeking seem to be the only motivations that globalization acknowledges.
Third, consider the effect that globalization has on the environment, especially with its consequences for citizens of the poorest nations – the rape of huge and cheap treasuries of raw materials. I would agree that the culling of the rain forests, the desertification of hitherto productive land, the overfishing of lakes, rivers, and coastal waters, the loss of habitats for endangered species, had been going on before the multinationals had really started to exploit the developing nations for cheap natural goods. I admit too that there are some signs of concern – global warming, for example, is bothering everyone except George W. Bush. But the exploitation of these natural resources, which are not as “renewable” as some optimists would have us believe, has never been driven so ruthlessly before.
International production is eating away at the resources of the developing world, and ecosystems and habitats are disappearing at an alarming rate. As I’ve suggested already the stringent conditions that the IMF and the World Bank put on their loans, and the timetables for repayment, add to the problems. Poor countries have to service their debts before spending their funds on their own needs: roads, schools, hospitals (and expensive drugs), the welfare of those orphaned by AIDS, or the simple survival of the worst-off. Their only option – the IMF/World Bank conditions leave few if any alternatives – is to increase the ravaging of the land, rivers, and sea, so as to sell even more on the world market. But then there’s a glut, an oversupply; and prices fall. So twice as much has to be exported to earn the same amount of foreign currency. Multinational corporations do just fine. Their debts are serviced, profits are up, the shareholders happy, and inflation is kept under control (Remember my earlier example of coffee.) But this is not free trade. The freedom is that of the multinational corporations. The losers are, again, the developing countries, with plundered rainforests, seacoasts poisoned with pesticides, fisheries exhausted. In Jakarta last year over 70% of water-samples proved to be highly contaminated by chemical pollutants; and 30% of the forests in Sarawak have disappeared. Examples could be multiplied indefinitely.
Quite apart form the threat to wildlife, and the fact of global warming (etc.) we can see the destruction, or threat of destruction, of ways of life, traditions, elements of tribal or national culture, in this. The fishing villages in parts of Asia are ghost-villages: there are no buyers, because polluted waters and overfishing mean no fish. Hence: desperate people trying to emigrate.
To consider more fully how nationalism reacts to this, and might act as a check on it, let us go back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The scientific rationalism of such as Condorcet or Bentham deeply disturbed Mill and Tocqueville, for much the same reasons as, later, the fear of its consequences with respect to social control fuelled the satirical Utopias of Orwell and Huxley. Carlyle, Ruskin, Disraeli, Thoreau, and Fourier ware either repelled by it, or fiercely attacked it. The unease, or the repulsion, was due to the implication inherent in the idea of the “one true part to the only true goal”, social control would be legitimised, and the individual relegated to being just a pawn in the game. If the goal is fixed, and fixed (in today’s world) by unknown and unaccountable strangers, then all that is left is how to find the most efficient means to it. One objection to the “scientific” plan for human good seen in such as Condorcet or Bentham was that it left the individual no room for choice, for imagination, for debating ends and fundamental values. He was to be manipulated, for an ideal in whose construction he played no part, sacrificed on an altar of abstractions. This is what Orwell and Huxley attacked so bitterly and brilliantly. This is what horrified so many people when the true ambitions of behaviourism became clear, note that the title of one of B.F. Skinner’s books is BEYOND Freedom and Dignity; and almost the only significant difference between his Utopia, in his Walden Two, and those of Orwell and Huxley, is that he does think that this is an ideal world.
According to the pessimist, the individual, from whatever country – thanks to unchecked globalization – is now no better off than are the imagined creatures in these utopian satires. He is just another cog in the wheel, and an interchangeable cog at that: the profit motive demands cheap labour, and does not care if that be Indonesian, Filipino, Mexican, African. If the demand is to produce Nike shoes or footballs or bottle-tops as cheaply as possible, then take the business to Bangladesh rather than to California – they will agree to less than $2 an hour in Bangladesh. If it seems that in the Philippines the workers would agree to undercut the Bangladeshis: then OK, shift the business there. Individual workers are simply means to the global profit seeking end. This directly denies a most central Kantian theme: the heart of his ethical system is that people must not be treated simply as means, but must always be recognised to be ends in themselves. Inability to comprehend the force of that gives us unashamed exploitation; indeed it is “beyond” freedom and dignity.
Isaiah Berlin finds in Machiavelli someone who simply denied that ends or values were single and universal. It was for personal reasons that he chose Machiavelli in particular, Machiavelli happened to be the first person he read who started to shake his faith in the dominant monolithic views of something like, or descended from, the Platonic ideal of “one true state system”, universally and everywhere valid. We find, in Machiavelli, the “Roman” way of life: advocating bravery, resourcefulness, pride, the ability to seize opportunities, political guile, willingness to use force – the qualities of the lion and the fox, aiming at the power and the glory of the body politic. Set against this, and incompatible with it, is the notion of the Christian virtues: humility, the acceptance of suffering, self-sacrifice, meekness, unwordliness, aiming at the perfection of the individual life. He did not say one is right, true, correct, and the other wrong, false, incorrect. It is easy to see which he prefers. But there is no overarching criterion which decides between them on the basis of anything like truth. They can’t however be combined; their values are incompatible.
Thoughts such as this became increasingly influential, sometimes getting right in to cultural relativism. Cultures – whatever is included in that slippery term – are not the sorts of things to be judged “correct”, “incorrect”, “bad”, or “good”. Every society has its own pattern, its own vision, of reality (of the world around it), of its own nature, of its aims or destiny. This shows itself in everything the people in that community do, think, feel, or say. This inspires mass loyalty, as transnational institutions cannot. A Spaniard would fight if Spain were attacked; he would be unlikely to risk his life for the EU. He might stand proudly for the Spanish national anthem, but not even recognise the “EU anthem”. What is more, these visions may be incommensurable, or exclude each other (as with Machiavelli’s “Roman” and “Christian” values). Thus a distinction has been drawn between science (as then conceived), and the humanities; the dogma that all knowledge forms a seamless whole is rejected. Utopias, although they may stimulate the imagination, are dangerous and misleading; fortunately, given human nature, they are ultimately unrealizable. But it is not necessary to go all the way into relativism. It might be better to call it “pluralism”. The difference from relativism is due simply to the constraints of our common human nature – these limit the range of intelligible options.
There may be an indefinite number of different plants in a forest, but they all belong in the one forest, and depend on the same soil. This suggests, as seems not to be the case with relativism, that we can – without needing to share, or even like, the values we find in other societies – at least come (perhaps with an effort) to understand them and see what part they play in the warp and weft of that society. The elegant sophisticates of nineteenth-century Paris could, with an effort understand the world which Homer’s warriors inhabited.
So far we have an argument to repudiate one version of globalization, a version that contemporary politicians, who endorse and support globalizing attitudes, would also repudiate, or say that they repudiate:
and ideology that involves a strong form of cultural monism. But, remember, we do not need diverse national sentiments to make the point. It is very important to note that there are other forms of community, and most of these could be used to defend the anti-globalization arguments rehearsed above: clans, tribes societies – even societies such as the Mafia – cities, provinces, the colonies of a far-flung empire.
Many religious groupings have a cohesive and self-sufficient way of life, however strange they might appear to an outsider, think of the self-contained, German-speaking, Amish communities in North America.
Even religious communities that do not physically share territory may have a consistent cultural outlook that comes first with them and informs most of their activities – I am thinking as possible examples, of Jehovah’s Witnesses or Christian Scientists. Islamic fundamentalism is very universal; some orthodox Muslims in the city of Bradford (in the UK) were as outraged by Salman Rushdie’s “sacrilegious” book, Satanic Verses, as were the mullahs in Iran.
Moreover, colonies under empires at the height of their powers were, for the most part, content with the lack of full nationhood, since many had never had it anyway, and their cultural diversity could be expressed, much as before, in their subnational groupings, with their own ways of doing things, their own religious traditions, their own languages, their own territory, which sensible empires prudently allowed. (“For the most part”, because there were always nationalists in all these places, just as there are nationalists today in constituent states of Britain (Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), in the Basque region of Spain, the province of Quebec, and many others.) Non-nationalist ties and loyalties can provide the conditions required to realize human dignity and integrity. So more, then, is needed, to explain nationalist sentiment.
Consider the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Exploration, and the need for mappings were relevant. Explorers returned with news of different peoples, different kingdoms and empires, different ethnic groupings and religious traditions; with news about the various ways in which other societies were organised. Travellers thus contributed to the improvement of maps; and of course they also needed them.
The communities - nations, kingdoms - they described had to be distinguished from the ones next door, by maps based in part on the distinctions that could be found between these ethnic, religious, kinship-based communities; by which group was hostile to which of its neighbours. Moreover, some of the customs they found considerably surprised them. Herodotus provides one of the first examples. He describes how some Greek explorers met members of an Indian tribe. Somehow they managed to make themselves understood by the other party. The Indians were truly horrified by the Greek habit of burning their parents on a ceremonial pyre. The only way, for them, of showing due respect was, reverently, to eat them.
Wars (and threats to and from neighbouring nations) are highly significant to the forging of a sense of national unity. At least when citizen-armies started to be used; before the Napoleonic wars, many if not most assaults against other states were conducted by proxy, through mercenaries. (Most of those fighting on the British side in America's war of independence were mercenaries). But, to resist the grand ambitions of Napoleon, nations had to rally themselves to meet the challenge. Not only conscription from all parts of the country; but nation-wide taxation to finance the struggle. National armies bring together men from every “subordinate” social grouping; mixing northerners and southerners, urban and rural peoples, those from the provinces and those from the capital; from every socio-economic group; from all religions or none. Subordinate loyalties were just that: subordinated; to a national loyalty, which trumped, in times of crisis facing the country, all other ties. The modern British income tax (there were of course taxes before) dates from Pitt the Younger, introduced nation wide precisely to fund the improvement of the army and navy. Such taxation presupposes much more information about the population as a whole; so we start to see censuses taken.
Napoleon was not the only one to want an empire. The rest of the world, to many Europeans; was there to be colonized, to a great extent in the interests of exploitation of underdeveloped peoples is seen in all political ideologies, and the European merchants of the time were indeed those who must ardently supported the colonizing drive. That meant not only finding out who was where (maps again) to establish their colonies; but also to know which European power was claiming adjacent areas - the “scramble for Africa” is one infamous illustration of this. The model of colonization used was European: centralized capitals were created, princedoms, principalities, or tribes that had hitherto been relatively autonomous were drawn together, as for instance in India or the Malay peninsula. To facilitate this, an infrastructure of roads, railways, and communications sprang up. Again for ease of control, one “official” language was declared, preferably of course English, French, Portuguese, Spanish etc; and that, of course, presupposed the provision of new educational systems.
Evidently this map-drawing, whether it involved the rubbing-out of lines implicitly drawn between principalities or tribes, or the drawing of new sharper lines around “a state”, cuts across elements we think to be parts of nationalism (s). We have seen the possible significance of allegiance to a religious identity, we have heard about pan-Arab nationalism. Just as important, and helping to explain the current appalling struggle in parts of Africa: many of the states there are artificial creations of the British or French colonial administrators, and cut-across the map of African ethnic nations. So in Rwanda and Burundi, for example, we have bloody violence between Tutsis and Hutus – the political relics of European colonialism.
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