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| Kathy Wilkes Dr Honoris Causa of the University of Zagreb 2001 |
| By Prof.Dr. Darko Zubrinic |
Published
07/4/2012
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Bilingual , Croatian Heroes , Human Rights , People , In Memoriam , Education
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Kathy Wilkes at the University of Zagreb in 2001, part 3
Carstva su obično i iz razumljivih razloga obeshrabrivala nacionalističke pokrete u zemljama ili kolonijama pod svojom kontrolom, pa u razdoblju kad je carstvo bilo na vrhuncu moći nisu ni bili značajni većini ljudi u pripadajućim kolonijama. Vladajuće snage mudro su im ostavile njihova lokalna središta gdje su imali svoj identitet i svoj "dom" – sa svojim obiteljima, klanovima, plemenima, religijskim grupacijama, jezicima (iako su se trebali koristiti "službenim" jezikom za suradnju s "vlastima"); oni su zadržavali svoje komadiće zemlje, svoje vođe klanova ili plemena, svoje gradove i sela. Privrženost gradu bila je doista jaka i u Europi. Vjerojatno je da je Machiavelli o sebi mislio više kao o Firentincu nego kao o Talijanu; Samuel Johnson zasigurno je bio prvo Londonac, a tek onda Englez; činjenica da je Britanac bila je tek na skromnom trećem mjestu. Danas u Pakistanu (nekad, naravno, koloniziranom) to vidimo u primjeru 72–godišnjaka Nawaba Akbara Bugtija, koji je upravljao područjem od 400 četvornih milja (oko 1.000 četvornih kilometara) Balocha sve otkako je s dvanaest godina postao poglavar: "Stoljećima sam Bugti i Balochar, a Musliman sam 1.400 godina. Pakistanac sam tek 50 godina". U vlastitom samoodređenju pripadnost Pakistanu bila je tek na četvrtom mjestu. Tako je i s njegovih 200.000 ljudi koji više vjeruju njegovoj procjeni i ispravnom djelovanju nego pakistanskoj vladi. Sve te "alternative" nacionalnog osjećaja pojavile su se zato što su osim tradicionalnih dijelova zemljoposjeda zadržali i cjelokupno kulturno breme – pjesme i priče, zajedničke uspomene, mitove i legende, načine djelovanja.
Takve nenacionalističke spone stvarale su uvjete potrebne za ostvarenje njihova identiteta, dostojanstva i integriteta. (Ponovno bih vas podsjetila na samodostatne amiške zajednice u SAD i Kanadi.)
Dakle, osvrt na slom carstava trebao bi nam pružiti daljnje objašnjenje za uspon nacionalizma. U svima od njih oduvijek je bilo nacionalista. Ponekad zbog korupcije ili nesposobnosti, a ponekad zbog toga što su se previše proširila, carstva poput nekadašnjeg habsburškog ili otomanskog oslabila su i počela gubiti snagu; osjećajući to nacionalisti su brojčano ojačali i povećavali pritisak u smjeru vlastite vladavine. Općenito uzevši, sve se više širila želja za većom autonomijom i saznanje da su bili potlačeni i izrabljivani. Ali ta želja za autonomijom i demokracijom (tu se pojam nacionalizma ponovno javlja) nije bila tek apstrakcija. Bilo je to mnogo više za njihove narode: Poljake, Litvance, Ukrajince. Ideja revolta postala je još privlačnijom zbog činjenice da je u posljednjim izdisajima (recimo) Otomansko Carstvo trebalo reagirati na vlastite nedostatke projicirajući ih izvan centra, stežući čvršće podčinjene narode: Otomansko Carstvo u svojim je posljednjim godinama bilo najmanje tolerantno prema nekonformizmu i oštrije u kažnjavanju nepokornosti nego ikada prije. Tako su podčinjeni narodi doista bili potlačeni. Neka su se carstva raspala dosta mirnije; npr. sovjetsko carstvo – mnogi su ostali iznenađeni njegovom relativno mirnom dezintegracijom. Mnoga carstva i stvarno umjetne tvorevine, kao što je bila bivša Jugoslavija, smatrali su se nepoželjnima i nepotrebnima kada se njihov glavni razlog postojanja – stvaranje kišobrana radi zaštite svoje kolonije od stvarne ili izmišljene vanjske prijetnje – počeo smatrati pretjeranim. Bez neprijatelja (a Gorbačov je uspio uvjeriti građane SSSR–a da Zapad ne planira pod svaku cijenu baciti na njih nuklearnu bombu) takva u osnovi umjetna jedinica shvaćena je onakvom kakva je doista i bila – umjetnom, a konstituirajuće države su uvidjele da bi im bilo bolje da brinu same za sebe, za svoje građane i svoje gospodarstvo uz punu nezavisnost.
Zbog arbitrarnosti mnogih kolonijalizmom nametnutih podjela, nakon povlačenja kolonizatorskih snaga često ostane malo toga što bi podržavalo bilo kakvu lojalnost prema umjetno stvorenim kolonijalnim jedinicama.
Ponekad neka vanjska prijetnja pomogne taj proces; Eritrejci su npr. postali čvršće "Eritrejci" kad su se morali udružiti kako bi se borili protiv velikog susjeda Etiopije. Bilo zbog pobune ili složnosti, nove nezavisne države moraju iznaći kako ujediniti svoju zemlju i upravljati njome. Bilo je potrebno uzdati se u vlastite snage, što prije nije bilo potpuno iskušano.
Novooslobođene države morale su se nadati da će nacionalna odanost zajedno s građanskim identitetom vezanim baš uz neku određenu nacionalnu državu, postati "adutom" svih ostalih vrsta odanosti, bez obzira na to je li riječ o privrženosti manjim (kao klan ili pleme) ili većim zajednicama (poput nostalgije za bivšim SSSR-om, bivšom Jugoslavijom ili Britanskim Carstvom). Možda su naučeni smatrati da se njihovo središte identiteta i mogućnost demokratske samouprave temelje na državi i da to ne mogu uvijek lako "preuzeti", osobito ako su prethodne lojalnosti i identiteti jaki, a neke nove nacionalne države umjetne i proizvoljne tvorevine nastale kao pogodnost kolonizatorskim snagama. (Prisjetite se riječi 72–godišnjeg Naswaba Akbara Bugtija: za nj, biti Pakistanac bilo je tek na četvrtom mjestu.) Ne treba pokušavati ukloniti te druge spone – zapravo svaka takva ambicija bila bi doista uzaludna. Međutim, u trenucima nacionalne krize, nada nacionalista, zapravo njihovo očekivanje jest da nacionalni osjećaj nadvlada sve druge privrženosti. Ipak, i oni mogu imati svoje manje teškoće usporedive problemima carstva. Mnoge nacionalne države imaju poddržavne nacionalističke grupe, obično etnički zasnovane ili izražavane na temelju povijesti: sjetite se Flamanaca, Škota, Velšana, Bretonaca, Korzikanaca, Baska, Kurda. Uopće, današnje nacionalne države imaju sve više teškoća s pravom etničkih ili vjerskih manjina unutar svojih granica, pojačanih proteklih godina masovnim povećanjem broja onih koji traže azil i donose sa sobom kulturu koja je starosjediocima potpuno strana. Različite nacionalne države rješavaju takve probleme različitim strategijama, a vrlo ih malo može potvrditi barem nekakav uspjeh.
Još jedan razlog zbog kojeg je teško postići da nacionalizam "nadjača" ostale privrženosti jest što se ljudi međusobno žene i sele. Kojoj nacionalnoj državi treba biti privržen Židov majke Rumunjke i oca Velšana koji živi u Francuskoj? Vjerojatno najviše problema s izdvajanjem "glavne" lojalnosti imaju obrazovani i prostorno pokretljivi pojedinci s višestrukim i preklapajućim izvorima identiteta u svojoj državi, svojoj vjeri, svom gradu, svojoj pripadnosti npr. pokretu zelenih; eurofili će se rado prozvati Europljanima, a isto tako i Francuzima. Klasična populacija seljaka kao što su kosovski Albanci ili Rusini mogu htjeti zaštititi svoj identitet na jedini njima dostupan način: državom. To je očajnička težnja koja zajedno s dubokim osjećajem nepravde i mržnje prema okupatorskoj moći potiče palestinsku intifadu. Istinski pobornik globalizma gledao bi na te nacionalističke osjećaje sa zbunjenim prezirom; oni su površni, predstavljaju zadršku, prolaznu fazu, nevažni su. Optimisti su vjerovali da će se iznenadni procvat ekstremnih nacionalističkih osjećaja i (česta) netrpeljivost prema svemu što nije s njima u skladu smanjiti i ugasnuti: ako je nastalo kao posljedica tlačenja ili prijetnje, sigurno će nestati kad se jednom uklone te prepreke? Zapravo, prvo bi trebalo ostvariti te nove nacionalne države, na temelju njihova vlastitog iskustva, poniženja i težnje za autonomijom i jednakošću vlastitih manjinskih zajednica. Dakle, i opet mnogi liberali i socijalisti slično misle da je nacionalizam stranputica – možda posve razumljiva, ali da je on nešto što bi novooslobođene države trebale i morale prerasti. To je bila prolazna, privremena faza. Nacionalni osjećaj, domoljublje – i to je posve razumljivo, ali nacionalizam, ekstreman i potencijalno opasan jer je netolerantan – to je nažalost ljaga nacionalne države. Globalizacija je ovdje korisna obuzdavajući prevelik ili netolerantan nacionalizam time što otkriva sve oblike nacionalizma – smatrajući ih tek zamornom smetnjom.
Naravno, tako se ne događa; netolerantni nacionalizam bio je tijekom dvadesetog stoljeća čimbenik – ponekad razarajući, ponekad u pozadini – koji je kulminirao takvim nesrećama kao što su genocidi, rat u Ruandi i Kongu te u različitim fašističkim ili drugim ksenofobičnim i/ili rasističkim predrasudama. Ako se druge nacije smatraju preprekom ili prijetnjom tijeku sudbine moje nacije, onda je moja obveza prisiliti ih na uzmak, ako treba i silom. Ako njihove vrijednosti nisu i moje vrijednosti, to gore po njih.
Kao nenacionalistička strategija pokazala se potpora liberala multikulturalizmu (gdje je metafora za naciju da je poput miješane salate prije nego melting pot, tj. "lonac za taljenje") potičući programe poput afirmativne akcije koja traži npr. određeni broj upisnih mjesta na sveučilištima, zakone o zapošljavanju – čak i na račun dominantne većine; izravno prkoseći "monokulturalizmu". Jedan od najznačajnijih učinaka imalo je to na obrazovanje (što je osobito jasno u SAD). Tijekom 1970–ih, nakon (dugog) razdoblja u kojem se analogija s "loncem za taljenje" smatrala jedinim načinom postizanja harmoničnog nacionalnog jedinstva, počelo se smatrati da je školski program previše anglo– ili eurocentričan. Njime se doseljenicima onemogućavalo shvaćanje vrijednosti vlastite kulturne baštine, namećući im samo povijest, književnost i pretpostavke anglosaksonskog protestantizma – sliku bijelog anglo–saksonskog protestanta (WASP, prema White Anglo-Saxon Protestant). Taj zastarjeli program trebalo je zamijeniti radikalno restrukturiranim programom koji uzima u obzir posve različite kulturalne i društvene tradicije i običaje koje učenici donose u učionice; školske lekcije koje jednako značenje pridaju neeuropskoj koliko i europskoj povijesti i književnosti, naglašavajući postignuća nebijelaca i nezapadnjaka te koja ističu tamniju stranu američke povijesti – primjerice trgovinu robovima i odnos prema autohtonim Indijancima. Smatralo se da bi se shvaćanjem bogatih raznolikosti svjetskih povijesnih i kulturnih tradicija razbila uskogrudnost koja je navodno obilježavala američke stavove i stvorila nove tolerancije i poštivanje kulturnih razlika. Liberali koji su sve to zastupali bili su stoga teško razočarani kada su neki pripadnici imigrantskih zajednica reagirali sami krajnje kvazinacionalistički. Oni su npr. inzistirali da Muslimani moraju imati vlastite prostorije na sveučilištima, da ne bi obvezno trebali prisustvovati satovima američke povijesti – zapravo da bi trebali imati (isključivo) svoje škole; da bi predavanja trebala biti na njihovom materinjem jeziku, da bi trebalo prihvatiti zakone koji bi im dopustili poligamiju. Paradoks je da su američki antinacionalisti tako frustrirani nacionalističkim lojalnostima (uglavnom etničkih) manjina u svojoj sredini.
Ironično, rasistički nacionalist Le Pen pronašao bi mnogo toga s čime bi se složio u tom pritisku separatizma. On je predložio da bi neeuropljanima koji žele živjeti u Francuskoj trebalo dopustiti život u vlastitim getima u kojima bi mogli raditi što im drago; samo da se drže podalje od nas ostalih. To je svakako bio oblik priznavanja razlika između kultura, ali ne i poštovanje prema njima; to je prije izraz prijezira – vrsta kulturalnog apartheida. Ako se takva getoizacija prihvati, ideja o jedinstvu nacije-države bit će stvarno odbačena.
Reakcija protiv multikulturalizma donijela je sa sobom tamniju stranu nacionalizma uključujući predrasude i ksenofobiju te dovela do rasizma i u krajnjim slučajevima do genocida ili etničkog čišćenja. Ipak, dio te reakcije vrijedan je poštovanja ukoliko proizlazi iz potrebe za kritičkim razumijevanjem različitih kultura, uključujući domorodačku kulturu. Na primjer jaki argumenti koje netko postavlja trebali bi biti univerzalno prihvaćeni nasuprot "tradicionalnih" običaja kao što je klitoridektomija (obrezivanje žena; genitalno sakaćenje). Trebali bi biti univerzalno prihvaćeni stoga što teško nanošenje tjelesne
boli jest ili bi trebao biti zločin u svakoj zemlji i na svakom jeziku. Slično, običaj dogovaranja brakova u Indiji, Pakistanu i Bangladešu zaslužuje barem preispitivanje, kao što zaslužuje i običaj obrednog klanja koji slično nalažu židovstvo i islam – za neke je to duboko uvredljivo. Tolerancija je naravno dobra – tko bi se hvalio time što je netolerantan? Tolerancija očito ne može tolerirati netoleranciju, ali to nije sve što ne bi trebalo tolerirati: neki su običaji, ili se može raspravljati jesu li, neprihvatljivi poput ljudožderstva, ropstva, mučenja ili čedomorstva. Dio istine je u mišljenju da postoje neke činjenice o ljudskoj prirodi koje ograničavaju izbore načina života. Da ponovim prije izrečenu metaforu: svim biljkama u šumi zajedničko je isto tlo. Promijenim li to u vodenu metaforu: postoji talog zajedničkih vrijednosti koji moramo priznavati jednostavno zbog činjenice o našoj ljudskoj prirodi.
Dio reakcije koji se ne može zanemariti nastaje zbog straha i negodovanja. Negodovanje zato što (recimo) postoji afirmativna akcija u zapošljavanju; ona neizbježno donekle umanjuje prilike onima u dominantnoj većini. Inzistiranje na tome da se prema nekom postupa kao prema posebnom i drukčijem u nekima stvara kritičnost ili odbijanje njihove (većinske) kulture. Ponašanje prema islamu i židovstvu kao da su jednaki npr. kršćanstvu čini se da svodi kršćanstvo na "tek još jednu religiju". "Ne postoji put do Oca osim kroz mene" – mora nijekati kršćansku toleranciju prema ostalim "putovima". Nadalje, tu je i bojazan da će biti "progutani" – osobito u gradovima u kojima su pridošlice gotovo jednako brojni kao i većinska populacija. Budući da sva grupiranja (bilo na razini nacionalne države ili na razinama vjerskih ili plemenskih ili etničkih zajednica) moraju neizbježno biti jednim dijelom prikazivana kao ono što ona nisu - uplašene ili ogorčene pridošlice mogu biti demonizirane. Javljaju se stereotipi; sve Muslimane sumnjiči se za fundamentalizam, svi crnci su kriminalci; pred početak hladnog rata MacCarthy je lako mogao prikupiti potporu za progon osumnjičenih komunista: komuniste se smatralo opasnim "drugima". Bez takvog stereotipiziranja (sjetite se samo protuhrvatske propagande ovdje 1990. i 1991.) "moja" skupina ne može biti spremna za borbu. Kada nije u pitanju nacionalni interes i kad se ne osjeća opasnost, teže je okupiti vojsku. Otuda i NATO-vi zračni napadi u ratu zbog Kosova; SAD je želio rat bez žrtava jer ih javnost ne bi prihvatila. Mnogi su Škoti pitali zašto škotski bataljuni moraju uopće biti tamo; u svijesti javnosti njihova nacija nije bilo ugrožena. Velik dio otpora u vrijeme vijetnamskog rata bio je posljedica pitanja: Zašto smo ovdje? Rat se ipak nastavljao jer je za vrijeme hladnog rata dovoljno Amerikanaca iskreno vjerovalo u stvarnu komunističku prijetnju Sjedinjenim Državama da bi "naše momke" zadržalo tamo.
Smrt nacionalizma često se predviđa, ali nacionalizam nikada ne nestaje i često ponovno izbije na površinu jakim intenzitetom. Prema nekima, on je glavni izvor njihova identiteta, zajedno sa zemljom koju mogu zvati svojim domom, s međusobno usklađenim načinom života, sudjelovanjem u demokraciji (konačno, demokracija pretpostavlja "demos"), sa simbolima, zajedničkim iskustvima, vjerojatno selektivno obojenom poviješću, zajedničkim jezikom i književnošću, i tako dalje. Za druge to je tek jedan takav izvor i k tome sve manje važan: biti musliman ili kršćanski scijentist može biti gotovo jednako važno; institucije kao što su OSS, UN, WTO, Svjetska banka, MMF, Europski sud za ljudska prava, NATO, ASEAN, itd. postaju sve značajnije. Možda globalizacija, barem u svijesti onih koji uživaju njezine prednosti, ima prije svega svrhu umanjiti značenje nacionalizma. Kao što smo vidjeli, čini se da je sve veća moć multinacionalnih kompanija često jača od moći nacionalnih država, koje se ponekad i previše trude uskladiti sa zahtjevima multinacionalista ili s ograničavajućim uvjetima nametnutim od MMF-a ili Svjetske banke. Kad država gubi punu kontrolu nad nacionalnom ekonomijom, zasigurno gubi i važan element vlastite suverenosti. Odluke koje negdje daleko donose bezlični i neodgovorni pojedinci sve više utječu na stvaranje nacionalne politike, pa što je onda zapravo smisao glasovanja? (Znalci predviđaju rekordni pad u odzivu birača na britanske opće izbore 7. lipnja. "Apatična stranka" dobiva većinu glasova.)
Globalizacija može obuzdati krajnosti nacionalizma raskrinkavajući ga. Ipak, bilo bi bolje kad bi se on sam mogao smatrati internacionalizmom – što pretpostavlja međusobne odnose nacija, a ne transnacionalizmom koji ih nadilazi. Kao transnacionalan, on teži nametnuti nešto što se može nazvati jedino ideologijom; a čini se da smo baš sada siti ideologija bilo zbog internacionalnog socijalizma, ili fašizma ili kršćanskih križara – sve je to stvorilo barem toliko genocida, etničkog čišćenja (itd.) koliko i bilo koji rasistički ili ksenofobički nacionalizam. (Mnogi su umrli u sovjetskim gulazima, a to je bilo zbog ideologije, ne zbog nacionalizma.) Današnja globalizacija također ubija ljude u najsiromašnijim zemljama. Biti kotačić u ambicijama multinacionalne korporacije nije nešto zbog čega bi vrijedilo umrijeti.
Nacionalizam neće nestati. Štoviše, dobroćudni nacionalizam budi se i u zemljama s odavno uspostavljenim granicama ako im se temelji čine poljuljanima – bilo zbog EU ili zbog navodnih muslimanskih fundamentalista, ili kad se – stvarno ili ne – starosjedioci počnu utapati među imigrantima; u takvim se trenucima s nacionalnih zastava otresa prašina i njima se počinje mahati, nacije podržavaju svoga vladara zvao se on Milošević ili Mugabe. No pozitivna strana "dobroćudnog" nacionalizma (za razliku od "negativne") nije ništa lošija od pokušaja da se sačuva identitet relativno male (male u usporedbi s Mitsubishijem ili General Motorsom) etničke, kulturne i jezične zajednice ostvarenjem i očuvanjem nezavisnosti kao suverene političke nacionalne države. Ne postoji proturječje između povećavanja broja nacionalnih država i sve jače međunarodne integracije: za ilustraciju, Slovenija se čim je izašla iz bivše Jugoslavije, odmah prijavila za članstvo u EU i NATO.
Globalizacija i nacionalizam su životne činjenice. Smatram da se nijedno od toga ne može tolerirati u dvadeset i prvom stoljeću ili pak biti korisno osim u neprekidnom dijalogu: tako da globalizacija često kontrolira krajnosti nacionalizma, dok benigni nacionalizam sprječava da se identitet pojedinca svede samo na potrošački. Da završimo gdje smo i započeli: bilo je razloga za prosvjede u Seattleu, Washingtonu i Pragu.
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Empires typically, and for obvious reasons, discouraged nationalist movements in the countries or colonies they controlled; and during the period when each was at its height, this didn't matter much to most of the people in the constituent colonies. The ruling powers sensibly left them with their local foci where they found their identity and their “home” – with their families, clans, tribes, religious groupings, language (even if they had to use the “official” language when dealing with “the authorities”); they kept their patches of land, their chieftains, their towns and villages. Indeed, city loyalty was strong in Europe too. It seems likely that Machiavelli thought of himself more as a “Florentine” than an “Italian”; Samuel Johnson was certainly a Londoner first, and Englishman second; being British came a very poor third. Today, in Pakistan (formerly colonised, of course) we find this from a 72-year old man, Nawab Akbar Bugti, who has governed 400 square miles of Baloch ever since he was made chief at the age of 12: “I have been a Bugti and Baloch for centuries, and a Muslim for 1,400 years. I have been a Pakistani for 50 years”. Clearly Pakistan comes fourth in his self identity. So, it seems, do his 200,000 people, who prefer to rely on him for judgement and fair dealing rather than the Pakistani government. All these “alternatives” to nationalist sentiment came not only with them keeping their traditional lands but also with the full cultural baggage - with their songs and stories, collective memories, myths and legends, ways of doing things.
Such (non-nationalist) ties supplied the conditions necessary to realize their human identity, dignity, and integrity. (I'd remind you of the self-sufficient Amish communities in the US and Canada.)
So, looking at the breakdown of empires should give us further clues to the rise of nationalism. In all of them there had always, of course, been some nationalists. Then, sometimes because of corruption or incompetence, sometimes because of being overstretched, empires such as the Habsburg or Ottoman ones weakened and started to falter; sensing this, the nationalists gained in strength of number and increased the pressure for self-rule. More generally, the desire for greater autonomy, and, the perception that they were oppressed and exploited, grew more and more widely. But this wasn't (and here the notion of nationalism reappears) a desire for autonomy and democracy in the abstract. Much more for their people: Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians. The idea of revolt was made more attractive by the fact that the last gasps of (say) the Ottoman empire was to react to its own failing by projecting them outside the centre, clamping down hard on the subject peoples: the Ottoman empire in its last years was at its most intolerant of non-conformity, and harsher in its penalties for non-compliance, than it had ever been before. Thus the subject peoples were indeed oppressed. Other empires fell apart rather more peacefully; I think for instance of the Soviet empire – many were surprised by the relative peacefulness of its disintegration. Many empires, and indeed artificial constructs such as the former Yugoslavia, were seen as unwanted and unnecessary when their main raison d’etre- to provide an umbrella to protect their constituent colonies from real or imagined external threats – was seen as de trop. Without an enemy (and Gorbachev succeeded in persuading citizens of the USSR that the West was not imminently planning to hurl nuclear bombs in their direction) an essentially artificial unity was seen for what it was, artificial; and constituent states realised that they could do better for themselves, their citizens, and their economies with full independence.
Because of the arbitrariness of many colonially-imposed divisions, once the colonizing powers retreated, there was often little left to underpin any loyalty to artificially-devised colonial unities.
Sometimes an external threat helped the process; Eritreans for example, became more solidly ”Eritrean” when they had to band together to fight their big neighbour, Ethiopia. Whether by rebellion or agreement, though, the newly independent states had to work out how to unify and run their countries. There was a need, not fully experienced before, to become self-reliant.
The newly-freed states had to hope that national loyalty, and with it one's identity as a citizen of just this nation-state, would come to be seen as “trumping” loyalties of all other kinds, whether smaller (like the clan or tribe) or larger (like a nostalgia for the former USSR, the former Yugoslavia, or the British Empire). They might have to be taught to regard their main locus of identity, and their prospect of democratic self government, to be something that rests with the state, and of course this may not always easily “take”, where pre-existing loyalties and identities are strong, and where some of the new nation-states are artificial and arbitrary constructs, drawn up for the convenience of the colonising powers. (Remember the comment of the 72-year old Nawab Akbar Bugti: for him, being a Pakistani come a poor fourth.) No attempt need be made to remove these other ties – indeed, any such ambition would be vain indeed. However in times of national crisis, the nationalists' hope, indeed their expectation, is that nationalist sentiment will trump other loyalties. They may also have, though, their own smaller-scale analogies to the problems of empires. Many nation-states have sub-state nationalist groups, usually ethnically based or claimed on historical grounds: consider the Flemings, the Scots, the Welsh, the Bretons, the Corsicans, the Basques, the Kurds. In general, today's nation-state have increasing difficulties with the right of ethnic or religious minorities within their borders, intensified in recent years by the massive increase in the number of those seeking asylum, and bringing with them their cultural baggage which can seem wholly alien to the indigenous population. Different nation-states have different strategies to deal with such problems, and very few can claim any degree of success.
Another reason for the difficulty in getting nationalism to “trump” other loyalties is that people intermarry and move. To which nation-state should the loyalty of a Jewish man with a Romanian mother, a Welsh father, living in France, be owed? Possibly these problems of isolating a “trumping” loyalty are chiefly seen in educated and mobile individuals, who have multiple and overlapping sources of identity in their state, their religion, their city, their membership of, say, Greenpeace; Europhiles will be happy to call themselves “European”, as well as “French”. Classical peasant populations, though, such as the Kosovar Albanians or Ruthenians, may want to protect their identity in the only way at hand: through a state. This is of course the desperate longing that, along with a deep sense of injustice and hatred of the occupying power, drives the Palestinian intifada. The true globalizer, of course, would look on these nationalist sentiments with mystified contempt; they are superficial, a throwback, a passing phase, unimportant. However: the optimists thought that the sudden flowering of extreme nationalist sentiment, and the (frequent) intolerance of anything not wholly in tune with it, would abate and wither away; if it had resulted from oppression or threat, surely it would vanish or die back once these obstacles had been removed? Indeed, these new national states should be the first to realise, from their own experience, the humiliation, and the craving for autonomy and equality, of their own minority communities. So, once again, many liberals and socialists alike thought that nationalism was an aberration – intelligible enough, maybe, but something that the newly-freed states would and should soon grow out of. It was a passing phase, ephemeral. National sentiment, patriotism – that may be intelligible enough; but extreme and potentially dangerous – because intolerant – nationalism: that is a regrettable blot on the nation-state. Globalization is useful here, serving to moderate excessive or intolerant nationalism, in that it debunks all forms of nationalism – considering them to be no more than a tiresome irritation.
Of course it hasn't happened that way, if anything, intolerant nationalism has been a factor – sometimes virulent, sometimes in the background – throughout the twentieth century, culminating in such disasters as genocides, the war in Rwanda and the Congo and in various fascist or other xenophobic and / or racist prejudices. If other nations are seen to represent obstacles or threats to the course of my nation's destiny, then I have an obligation to compel them to give way, if necessary by force. If their values are not my values, then so much the worse for theirs.
One non-nationalist strategy is seen in the liberals' support for multiculturalism (where the metaphor is of the nation as a mixed salad rather than as a melting-pot), encouraging policies such as affirmative action, requiring (for example) quota places at universities, employment legislation – even if at the expense of the dominant majority; directly challenging “monoculturalism”. This has had one of its most significant effects (and this is especially clear in the US) on education. In the 1970s, following the (long) period in which the “melting pot” analogy was thought to be the only way to get harmonious national unity, it came to be thought that the school curriculum was too Anglo-, or Euro-centric. This prevented immigrants from coming to understand the value of their own cultural heritage, forcing on them only the history, literature, and assumptions of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism – the WASP picture: “White Anglo-Saxon Protestant”. This outdated curriculum must be replaced by a radically restructured one, one that takes into account the very varied cultural and social traditions and customs which pupils bring to the classroom; school lessons that give as much weight to non-European history and literature as to European, highlighting the achievements of non-whites and non-Westerners; and which emphasised the darker side of American history – for example, the slave trade, and the treatment of the indigenous Indians. Coming to understand the rich diversity of the world's historical and cultural traditions would, it was thought, break-through the parochialism which allegedly characterised American attitudes, and lead to a new thought, break-through the parochialism which allegedly characterised American attitudes, and lead to a new tolerance of, and respect for, cultural differences. The liberals who advocated all this were, therefore, severely disappointed when some members of the immigrant communities reacted as extreme quasi-nationalists themselves. They might insist, for example, that Muslims should have their own halls of residence in universities; that they should not be obliged to attend lessons on American history – indeed, that they should indeed have their own (exclusive) schools; that lessons should be given in their native languages; that laws should be passed to allow them to engage in polygamy. The paradox is that American anti-nationalists are here being frustrated by the nationalist loyalties of the (mainly ethnic) minorities in their midst:
Ironically, the racist-nationalist Le Pen would find much to agree with in this push for separatism. He has proposed that non-Europeans who wanted to live in France should be allowed to live in their own ghettoes, wherein they could do as they pleased; just keep away from the rest of us. This was, certainly, a form of recognition of the differences between cultures, but was certainly not respect for them: rather, it was an expression of contempt – a sort of cultural apartheid. If such ghettoisation is accepted, the idea of the unity of a nation-state will effectively have been abandoned.
The backlash against multiculturalism, then, brought with it part of the darker side of nationalism, involving prejudice and xenophobia, and leading to racism and, in extreme cases, genocide or ethnic cleansing. There is, though a respectable part of the reaction, if it results from a demand for a critical understanding of the diverse cultures, the indigenous culture included. There are, for example, strong arguments that one could claim should be universally accepted against “traditional” practices such as clitoridectomy (female circumcision; genital mutilation) – universally accepted, because “grevious bodily harm” is or should be a crime in any land or language. Similarly, the practice of arranged marriages in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh deserves at least examination: as does the practice of ritual slaughter, demanded by Judaism and Islam alike – this is deeply offensive to some. Tolerance is of course a good – who would boast of being intolerant? It obviously cannot tolerate intolerance, though, but that is not quite all that it should not tolerate: some practices are, or can be argued to be, as unacceptable as cannibalism, slavery, torture, or infanticide. Here is part of the truth in the idea that there are some facts about human nature that constrict the choices of ways of life. To repeat the metaphor given earlier: the plants in the forest all share the some soil. To change to a watery metaphor, there is a sediment of common values which we have to acknowledge, simply because of the fact of our human nature.
The part of the backlash that cannot be condoned, though, is that due to fear and resentment. Resentment, because (say) their is affirmative action in employment; this of necessity somewhat reduces the chances for those in the dominant majority. The insistence on being treated as distinct and different appears to some to constitute a criticism or rejection of their (the majority’s) culture. Treating Islam or Judaism as being on a par with, say, Christianity seems to some to reduce Christianity to “just another religion”. There is no way to the Father except through me” – this must deny Christian tolerance of other “ways”. Then there is the fear of being swamped – particularly in towns or cities where the incomers are almost as numerous as the majority population. Because all groupings (whether at the nation-state level, or the levels of religious or tribal or ethnic communities) must inevitably be characterised in part by what they are not, the feared or resented outsiders can be demonised. Stereotypes spring up; all Muslims are suspected of being fundamentalists, all blacks are criminals; near the start of the cold war, MacCarthy could easily muster support for the persecution of suspected communists: communists were perceived as dangerous “others” Without such stereotyping (and think of the anti-Croat propaganda here in 1990-1) “my” group could not be rallied to fight. When national self-interest is not at stake, and no risk perceived, it is harder to rally the troops. Hence the NATO air-bombardment in the war over Kosovo; the US wanted a war with no casualties, because the public would not have accepted the need for body-bags. Many Scots asked why the Scottish battalions had to be there at all; in the popular mind, their nation was not being threatened. Much of the resistance at the time of the Vietnam war resulted from the question: why are we here? It kept going, though, because during the cold war enough Americans genuinely believed in the reality of a communist threat to the US to keep “our boys” there.
The death of nationalism has often been predicted, but it never disappears and frequently resurfaces strongly. To some it is a main source of their identity, with a land they can call home, with a way of life that is broadly congenial, with a participatory democracy (after all, democracy presupposes a “demos”) with symbols, shared experiences, a - perhaps selectively coloured – history, a common language and literature, and so on. To others it is just one such source, and a diminishingly important one; being a Muslim, or a Christian scientist, may be almost as important; institutions, such as the OSCE, the UN, the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, the European Court of Human Rights, NATO, ASEAN, (etc.) are increasingly significant. Perhaps above all globalization, at least in the minds of those who enjoy its benefits, tends to diminish the significance of nationalism. As we have seen, it looks as though the increasing power of the multinational companies is often more powerful than is that of nation-states, which sometimes bend over backwards to agree with the demands either of the multinationals, or with the stringent conditions imposed by the IMF or the World Bank. When a state loses full control over its national economy, it surely then loses an important element of its sovereignty.
Decisions made far away, by faceless and unaccountable individuals, determine increasing swathes of national policy-making; so what, really, is the point of voting? (The pundits are predicting an all-time low in the turnout for the British General Election on June 7th. The “Apathy Party” is gaining the most votes.)
Globalization can restrain the excesses of nationalism, by debunking it. But it would do better if it could itself be seen as internationalism – which presupposes relationships between nations – not as transnationalism, transcending them. When transnational, it seeks to impose what can only be called an ideology; and right now we seem to be sick of ideologies, whether from international socialism, or Fascism, or the Christian crusaders – all these have created as least as much genocide, ethnic cleansing (etc.) as any racist or xenophobic nationalism. (Many died in the Soviet gulags; and that was because of ideology, not nationalism.) The present-day globalization, too, is killing people is the poorest countries. Being a cog in a multinational corporation’s ambition is not something to want to die for.
Nationalism is not going to go away. Even “benign” nationalism, in countries with long-settled borders, is aroused if its foundations seem threatened – whether by the EU, or by alleged Muslim fundamentalists, or by a perceived – whether real or not – swamping of the natives by immigrants; at such times national flags are dusted-down and waved, the nation comes out for its ruler, even if he is called Milošević, or Mugabe. But the positive side (as distinct from the “reaction” side) of benign nationalism is nothing more sinister than an attempt to preserve the identity of relatively small (small by comparison to Mitsubishi, or General Motors) ethnic, cultural, and linguistic communities by achieving and maintaining independence as sovereign political nation-states. There is no contradiction between the multiplication of nation-states and increasing international integration; to illustrate this, Slovenia, as soon as it was free from the former Yugoslavia, immediately applied for membership of the EU and NATO.
Globalization and nationalism are facts of life. I suggest that neither, in the twenty-first century, can be tolerable or useful except in perpetual dialogue: globalization often checking the extremes of nationalism, while benign nationalism saves the individual from having no identity other than that of a “consumer”. To end where we began: there was a point to the protests in Seattle, Washington, and Prague.
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